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I Introduction
Law, experience, and philosophy of induction all tell us that fact-finding in
adjudication is a matter of probability rather than certainty. In civil trials,
upon which this essay focuses, a fact generally will be held as established
when it is 'more probable than not.' This standard is known as 'proof on a
balance of probabilities' or 'proof by a preponderance of the evidence.''
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The meaning of this standard and its application in contract cases are the
issues I seek to elucidate in this essay. The problem examined here is evidential scarcity and the resulting contingency of probability assessments.
Because trial evidence is always scarce, any probabilistic decision that triers
of fact make on the basis of available information will be open to challenge.
A decision could easily be justified, or even necessitated, by the existing evidence, if the latter were known to be sufficient. But the sufficiency of evidence is a largely unknown, if not altogether unknowable, factor. Factual
uncertainty is engendered by evidence that is missing, not by evidence that
is available, and nobody can point rationally to the facts that would be revealed by the missing evidence, if it were available. Triers of fact are, therefore, doomed to conditioning their probability assessments upon existing
evidence, in the hope that their findings can survive a potential collision
with other information of which they are unaware. The validity of probabilistic assessments made by triers of fact is always contingent on this hope.
The challenge posed by this contingency is central to the fact-finding enterprise as a whole. An argument that relevant allegations are more probable than not may be constructed upon virtually any amount of evidence,
however scarce that evidence may be. Any such argument may, consequently, be confronted by a counter-argument lamenting that the evidence is too
thin to justify a finding. Indeed, it can always be claimed that if additional
evidence were brought to the fore, the present probabilistic picture could
(or would) change. Our assessments of probability, both mathematical and
intuitive, are derived from evidence and experience. But experience also
tells us that these assessments are evidence-dependent, so that whatever we
decide will be conditioned upon our evidential base, which may be rich or
poor, or somewhere in between. Hence, how should judges2 proceed when
faced with an argument that the evidential base is not sufficiently solid?
My search for a solution to this quandary begins in Part II, whichjuxtaposes two conflicting interpretations of the civil standard of proof. According to the one interpretation, the civil proof standard can be satisfied by a
bare statistical probability that exceeds 0.5. This probability is allowed to
rest upon any evidential base, regardless of whether it is rich or poor. The
other interpretation holds that the civil standard of proof refers to the
strength (or density) of the relevant evidential support - that is, to the extent to which facts necessary for making a particular finding are specified by
2

Throughout this essay, the term 'judges' will refer generically to both judges and jurors.

In a jury system, problems dealt with in this essay would have to be resolved also by
judges in motions for a directed verdict, forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
in appellate review. Arguments about evidential insufficiency dealt with by this essay can
be raised (and are raised) within each of these frameworks.
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the evidence. Under this interpretation, sheer statistical chance has no probative significance. A factual proposition can be deemed more probable
than not only when it is supported by a substantial amount of case-specific
evidence - that is, when as a matter of inductive (as opposed to aleatory)
reasoning, the evidence points in its favour rather than to its negation. Part
II then demonstrates that this interpretive clash (commonly known as 'the
probability debate') is premised on a false dichotomy. Each of the above interpretations is ill-suited for practical reasoning, to which fact-finding in adjudication belongs, because each excludes from consideration an important dimension of fact-finding rationality that is focused upon by the other.
Judges ought to consider both the probability factor and the richness of the
evidence from which they derive that factor. Representing the chances of
revealing the truth, probability factors are obviously important for decision
making. At the same time, probability factors can differ in weight, depending on the richness of their supporting evidence. Some probability factors
are more strongly evidenced than others. They therefore should be regarded as weightier and correspondingly stronger than other probability factors.
This important dimension of fact-finding cannot be ignored.
Also detected in Part II is another shortcoming of 'the probability debate,' one that relates to the debate's categorization of the problem of naked statistics. Allowing verdicts to be based upon bare statistical evidence,
rather than on case-specific proof, is generally regarded as problematic. Adjudication involves individuals and their individual affairs, which need to be
translated into individual rights and duties. This is not the case with bare statistical evidence. As the famous saying goes, for statistics there are no individuals and for individuals, no statistics. For reasons that may already be apparent, I conceptualize this problem as one of 'low-weight probability.' This
problem is commonly perceived as epistemic because in cases involving
bare statistical evidence, there is no inferentially licensed extension that
could bond the general with the individual. Originating from the absence
of case-specific knowledge, the similitude between the litigated event and
the general class of events, upon which statistical inferences are constructed, is patently superficial.
Part II demonstrates that this categorization of the problem is incorrect.
From an epistemological point of view, case-specific inferences resting
upon naked statistics are unwarranted or, at best, deeply problematic. In a
case involving naked statistics and no other evidence, epistemology will advise thejudge that there is no warrant for any determination of fact and that
any finding she may make will be tainted with a serious risk of error. Hence,
there is no epistemological problem in such a case, because what epistemology has to say about naked statistics in the absence of other evidence is clear.
What is less clear is how to decide cases that involve bare statistical evidence,

302

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL

but on this epistemology has no say. Epistemology may tell judges that no
finding will satisfy its truth-conditions, butjudges cannot be halted in indecision even in a case like this. Any such case needs to be decided in one way
or another, which necessarily will allocate the risk of error to (at least) one
of the litigants. Allocation of this risk constitutes a moral rather than epistemological issue. Materialization of a risk of error entails denial of one's legal
right. Depending on the nature of the infracted right, this consequence of
risk-allocation may produce different degrees of harm. Proper resolution of
the issue therefore requires the decision maker to account for this possible
harm.3 Because evidence in adjudication is always lacking, this problem is
pervasive. Fact-finders have to deal with low-weight probabilities in virtually
every case. Bare statistical evidence is an extreme form of low-weight probability, and there are other low-weight probabilities that present similar factfinding problems and, therefore, call for allocation of the risk of error. Althe risk of error is, indeed, the primary objective of the law of
location of
4
evidence.
My previous analyses of this problem have examined its ramifications
and possible solutions within the frameworks of criminal law5 and the law of
torts. 6 This essay moves to the terrain of contracts, where it identifies a
number of distinct risk-allocating principles and policies that are suitable
for adoption. Echoing an approach I have taken in the past, 7 it proceeds endogenously by extracting the relevant principles and policies from the setfled law. The ensuing analysis is therefore purported to be both normative
and explanatory.
3

4
5

6
7

This point often has been ignored by those who claim that judicial verdicts should not
be allowed to rest upon bare statistical evidence because this would determine one's
rights through one's membership in a group, thus taking away one's moral right to be
treated as an individual. See, e.g., L. Tribe, 'Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process' (1971) 84 Har'. L. Rev. 1329. Putting aside the credentials of this
much acclaimed right, along with the questions that arise with regard to its desired
scope, it seems obvious that enforcing this right in a civil lawsuit would simply shift the
risk of error to the opponent of the right's beneficiary, who is no less an individual and,
as such, is entitled to equal concern and respect.
See generally A. Stein, 'The Refoundation of Evidence Law' (1996) 9 Can. J. Law &
Jurisp. 279.
See Stein, ibid. at 323-33. See also A. Stein, 'Criminal Defences and the Burden of
Proof' (1991) 28 Coexistence 133; A. Stein, 'After HUNT. The Burden of Proof, Risk of
Non-Persuasion and Judicial Pragmatism' (1991) 54 Mod. L. Rev. 570; A. Stein, 'From
Blackstone to Woolmington: On the Development of a Legal Doctrine' (1993) 14J. Leg.
Hist. 14.
See A. Porat & A. Stein, 'Liability for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable' (1997) 18 Cardozo L.R. 1891.
See Stein, supra note 4.
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This essay also offers an alternative explanation to the burden-of-proof
doctrine, as developed at common law with regard to contract cases. This is
done in Parts III to VIII, which begin with a remarkable marine insurance
case that went through threejudicial instances in England, ending up in the
House of Lords. 8 Dealing with insurance liability for causally uncertain losses, this case is of general importance. The issue it resolved could arise and
be resolved in the same way in any Anglo-American jurisdiction. There are
three other reasons for choosing this case for discussion. First, it exhibits
the low-weight probability problem (further analyzed in Part IV) in its purest form. Second, it simultaneously involves all the principles and policies
that ought to be at work in allocating the risk of error in contract litigation.
Finally, it enables concretization of what may seem to be an overly abstract
discussion. This case is, therefore, not only of doctrinal importance, but is
also paradigmatic, theoretically significant and heuristically valuable.
Parts V to VIII subsequently offer the following principles 9 for allocation
of the risk of error in contract litigation:
(1) the equality principle,which demands that the risk be allocatedbetween the plaintiff and the defendant in an equalfashion (PartV);
(2) the expectation principle,which requires that the risk be allocated in correspondence with the parties' contractualexpectations, explicit or implied (Part VI);
(3) the 'penalty-default' approach,which allocates the risk in a way thatforces parties into making an explicit contractualstipulationthat will allocatethis risk in
advance, consequently saving the litigation costs associated with contract interpretation (PartVII);
(4) the error-minimizingprinciple,which prescribesthat the risk be allocated in a way
that reduces the number of erroneous verdicts to a minimum. Discussed in Part
VIII, this principle is of particularimportance in the context of insurancecases,
where it helps to spreadthe costs of accidents efficiently, thereby implementing one
of the key objectives of the law of insurance.

These parts of the essay also delineate the scope of application for the
above principles.
8

9

Edmnunds (The Popi M) v. Rhesa Shipping Co., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 235 (Commercial
Court) [hereinafter Edmunds (Commercial Court)]; Rhesa Shipping Co. v. Edmunds (The
PopiM), [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 555 (C.A.) [hereinafter Rhesa Shipping(C.A.)]; Rhesa Shipping Co. v. Edmunds (The Popi M), [ 1985] 2 All E.R. 712 (H.L.) [hereinafter Rhesa Shipping

(H.L.)].
Throughout this essay, no distinction will be made between 'principles' and 'policies.' I
will proceed without committing myself to this distinction and its possible implications
for adjudication. To further stress this lack of commitment, the two concepts also will be
used interchangeably. For the distinction between the two concepts and its implications
for adjudication, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth & Co.,
1977) at 90-100.
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II The Two Dimensions of Fact-findingand the Problem of Uncertainty
A. The Civil Standard of Proof and its Two Interpretations
The requirements set by the civil standard of proof are open to two conflicting interpretations, both plausible and appealing. According to the one interpretation, the standard refers to a frequentist type of probability. This
probability may be calculated through enumeration of instances both favourable and unfavourable to the examined propositions, which, subsequently, is combined into a final probability assessment. The latter is generated mathematically by multiplying the probabilities of the propositions
necessary for the verdict. 10 The required probability may be assessed experientially by the fact-finder, in which case it will also be reflective of frequencies, although unenumerated. These frequencies (identified as 'personalist' or 'subjectivist') should be reducible, in principle, to mathematical data
that obey the ordinary rules of probabilistic calculus. Deviation from this
condition would imply that the reasoning followed by the fact-finder was
tainted with illogicality." According to this interpretation of the civil proof
standard, 'more probable than not' means that the chance that the finding
fits the actual event is greater than the chance that the finding is wrong. Exhibiting calculus of chances, the logic embedded in this form of reasoning
is aleatory in character. 12
According to the second interpretation, the civil standard of proof refers
to the degree of evidential support that underlies an examined proposition.
More specifically, this interpretation refers to the extent to which facts per13
taining to an examined proposition are specified in the evidence. Measuring the ground covered by the evidence, this approach clearly favours casespecific (or 'individualized') proof over naked statistics. Under this approach, the strength of the evidential support for factual propositions is examined comparatively. It is determined by the gap between the existing and
the ideal stock of evidence, with the latter representing the highest, albeit unreachable, level of evidential support. The evidential support gains strength
as the gap narrows, and vice versa. Consequently, if there is more substantial
evidence in support of a factual proposition than for its negation, then the
proposition will be held to be more probable than not. Instead of assessing
the favourable and the unfavourable odds under conditions of ignorance,
10
11
12
13

See generally B. Robertson & G.A. Vignaux, 'Probability: The Logic of the Law' (1993)
13 OxfordJ. Legal Stud. 457.
Ibid.
See L.J. Cohen, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989) at 13-27; ch. IV.
Ibid. at 4-13; ch. V.
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this approach evaluates the scope of the existing body of knowledge. It does
so by focusing upon the inductivejustification extended by this knowledge to
the inferences that connect the evidence with the ultimate probanda. For this
reason, this approach has been labelled 'inductivist'.
Under the aleatory framework of reasoning, the probability that event
A either occurred or did not occur amounts to 1, when 1 stands for certainty and 0 for impossibility. Consequently, P(A)=I-P(not-A), which is known
as the complementational principle for negation.14 Under the inductivist
framework of reasoning, meagre evidential support for proposition A does
not entail, ipso facto, massive support for not-A, and vice versa. Evidential
support is an empirical matter, also describable as a positive knowledge-factor. It derives from what the fact-finders actually have, not from what they
do not have. Under the aleatory framework, the chances that A and another proposition (B) occurred jointly are not as good as the chances that only
A (or B) occurred. Indeed, to succeed in a simple one-event gamble (with
regard to A only) is much easier than to succeed in a compound gamble
(with regard to both A and B). Consequently, P(A&B)=P(A)xP(B), which
is known as the multiplicational principle for conjunction. 16 Under the inductivist framework of reasoning, evidential support for proposition A&B
is equal either to the support for A or for B, whichever is weaker. 17 Assessment of the known and gambling on the unknown are two logically distinct
activities. Both are rational, but each is governed by its own, different type
of logic.
Aleatory probabilities can be derived from any knowledge, however thin
it may be. If I were to toss a coin without knowing whether or not the coin
is rigged, it would be warranted for me to place 1:1 odds on either heads or
tails. If I later were to discover that the coin is fair, I could justifiably make
an identical bet. Under the aleatory framework, my first assessment of the
odds is no less warranted than my second: if I happen not to know something, it is warranted for me to assume that the unknown possibilities, some
favourable and some unfavourable to my hypothesis, are equally probable. 18 This assumption is known as the 'principle of indifference'. 19 This
14
15

16
17
18
19

Ibid. at 17-18.
To avoid an unnecessary complication, it is assumed that A and B are two mutually independent propositions. If no independence is assumed, P(A&B)=P(A)xP(BIA), which

would have no impact on my discussion.
Cohen, supra note 12 at 18-19.
Once again, I assume that A and B are mutually independent and thus cannot corroborate each other.
See Cohen, supra note 12 at 43-47;J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probabdiliy, 1st ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1921) at 44.
It also has been labelled 'the principle of insufficient reason.' See Keynes, ibid.
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principle eliminates informational open-endedness that frustrates any attempt at determining probability. The principle of indifference replaces
this open-endedness with informational closure, easily governed by mathematical logic. Consequently, probability is calculated on the assumption
that facts relevant to the calculation are fully specified by the existing evidence. Artificial as it may sound, this assumption may be justified in the
long run. The unknown possibilities, some favourable and some unfavourable to the examined hypothesis, can be expected to cancel each other out
as the gambling proceeds. We can, therefore, exercise control over the ratio
of right versus wrong decisions by ignoring these possibilities.
In contrast, the inductivist framework is based on the 'principle of difference.' Within this framework, a proposition supported by a high amount
of evidence qualitatively differs from a proposition that rests on a slimmer
evidential base. Fact-finders should treat the former proposition as more
probable than the latter. This mode of assessing probabilities will apply
even when an aleatory probability, constructed on a slim evidential base, is
relatively high. In the example with the coin, if it were not known whether
or not the coin was rigged, it would be inductively unwarranted to say that
heads will come up in 50 per cent of the tosses (as indicated by placing 1:1
odds on either heads or tails). This prediction would have a far greater cogency if the coin were known to be fair. Within this framework, knowledge
is not allowed to be procreated out of ignorance. If I were to have no reason
for holding the coin either fair or biased, there would be no justification for
me to ascribe equal incidence to its fairness and bias. The extent to which
facts pertaining to the decision are specified by the evidence consequently
becomes the key factor that needs to be examined by fact-finders.
Aleatory probability assessments may be accompanied byjudgments regarding their resiliency. This resiliency will be contingent upon the survival
of a given assessment in the event of change in its underlying informational
base, which would be effected by the flow of new evidence. Because evidence is always lacking, the potential for arrival of new evidence makes any
probability assessment open to revision. An assessment's susceptibility to
such revision will determine its resiliency and corresponding strength. It is
obvious that some probability assessments are less open to revision than others, and there is a clear need to account for this factor. The greater the ability of an assessment to withstand potential changes in its informational base,
the more resilient and, correspondingly, more reliable a probability assessment it is. To act upon this assessment in practical affairs consequently becomes a safer endeavour. 20 Introduction of this resiliency factor brings the
aleatory and inductivist modes of reasoning closer to one another.
This fusion of the two modes of reasoning is, however, profoundly problematic. The resiliency of a probability assessment surely is an important
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factor, but setting an appropriate resiliency standard turns out to be a rather daunting task. If the standard is very demanding, it can be satisfied only
2
when the examined proposition approaches certainty or impossibility. ' Assessments that yield probabilities ranging between these two extremes
would never satisfy such a standard. If the probability of event A were to be
assessed as amounting to, say, 0.6, the assessment could not be deemed sufficiently resilient. This would be due to the fact that we would have no significant clue (C) as to what would cause A to occur as opposed to not-A. Our
assessment would be sufficiently resilient only if we were to have this clue.
But if we were to have this clue, we would have to transform our initial probability assessment, based upon the evidence previously available to us (E),
into a new assessment of a considerably more refined and, therefore, altogether new proposition. Instead of talking about P(AIE), we would be talking about P(AIE,C). And if our clue were substantial enough, our assessment of P(AIE,C) would not only be more evidenced than that of P(AIE);
indeed, if our knowledge of C were a real resiliency improvement, so that C
could be causally associated with A, then P(AIE,C) would be much higher
than 0.6.
Probabilities far removed from both certainty and impossibility therefore would not withstand a demanding resiliency standard. To keep these
probabilities alive, the resiliency standard would have to be lowered. An undemanding standard, however, would not take us very far from unmitigated
aleatory reasoning. There is room, of course, for setting a middle-ground
standard, but it would only intensify the tension between the inductive component of a probabilistic assessment and its aleatory component. There is a
perennial tension between the indifference principle and the resiliency requirement. The indifference principle promotes randomization, which is
exactly the opposite to what is promoted by the resiliency requirement. The
indifference principle allows for knowledge to be born out of ignorance, a
move that the resiliency requirement rejects. The indifference principle
22
and the resiliency requirement therefore cannot easily coexist.
More important, as we increase the demand for resiliency, our reasoning becomes more inductivist and less aleatory. To say that a judgment
attaching a 0.7 probability to proposition A fails to meet the resiliency requirement is epistemically equivalent to saying that A is not sufficiently
20

21

See, e.g., R.A. Fisher, StatisticalMethodfor Research Workers, 7th ed. (Edinburgh: Oliver &
Boyd, 1938) at 120ff; N.B. Cohen, 'Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a
World of Imperfect Knowledge' (1985) 60 N.YU.L. Rev. 385; J. Logue, Projective Irobability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 78-95.
Impossibility, of course, is a form of certainty. To say that event E is impossible is tantamount to saying that it is certain that event E did not or will not occur.
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evidenced. When an assessment of probability is epistemically weak, its
numerical content should make no epistemic difference. To disqualify a
probability assessment for not passing the minimal resiliency threshold
is tantamount to annulling its aleatory significance. Conversely, to say
that a judgment attaching a 0.7 probability to proposition A satisfies the
resiliency requirement is epistemically equivalent to asserting that proposition A is sufficiently supported by the evidence. Note that in this case,
we would be unable to ascribe a 0.3 probability to A's negation. The gap
left by adequate, although incomplete, evidential support cannot be
filled by probabilistic inferences that run against the proposition favoured by the evidence. Any such inferences would have to satisfy the resiliency requirement with their own evidential support. Proposition
P(not-A)=0.3 consequently cannot survive under a demanding resiliency
standard, which was satisfied by P(A)=0.7. Because this demanding standard was satisfied by A, it cannot be satisfied by not-A. In order to allow a
proposition and its negation to cohabit under one roof, we therefore
would have to accept abstract frequencies as epistemically sufficient for
constructing resilient probabilities. Such a relaxation of the resiliency
standard would take us back to aleatory reasoning. For supporters of trial
by mathematics, a non-relaxation of the standard would be no more
promising. It would prevent the ascription of a 0.3 probability to not-A,
which would entail abandoning the complementational principle. The
multiplicational principle, along with the complementational principle,
also would have to be discarded. If two independent propositions,
P(A)=0.7 and P(B) =0.7, both satisfy the resiliency requirement, whereas
their negations fail to satisfy it, to assert that P(A&B)=0.49 would be epistemically unwarranted. This assertion would be unwarranted because it
ascribes a positive (0.3) value to unevidenced propositions P(not-A) and
P(not-B). Abandoning the complementational and the multiplicational
22

Inspired by W. Kneale, Probabilityand Induction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949) at 147150, this point should not be understood as denying the validity of randomizing procedures. Numerous throws of a coin are likely to produce a roughly equal number of heads
and tails even when the attributes of the coin, along with the environmental conditions
of each individual throw and the relevant laws of physics, are totally unknown. In resolving legal disputes, a roughly equal number of correct and incorrect decisions can be
produced by following the same randomizing procedure or, more exotically, by allowing
a monkey to choose between two bananas that look alike, one of which carries the
inscription 'GUILTY' and the other 'NOT GUILTY.' In each of these cases, if we try to relate
the resulting 0.5 probability to any individual trial or coin-tossing, we would find the
probability disturbingly non-resilient (i.e., likely to be modified by virtually any addition
of relevant information). Far from being weighty, this probability would still retain its
validity as a randomizing device.
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a decisive departure from the aleatory frameprinciples would constitute
23
work of reasoning.
As may already be apparent, probability assessments depend on their resiliency not only in terms of cogency, but also in terms of content. Relaxation of the resiliency standard would permit construction of any probability
estimate along the 0-1 continuum. Making this standard more exacting
would exclude from consideration probability estimates that are far removed from both 0 and 1. Only those estimates coming close to certainty
(or impossibility) would survive. An increase in the flow of relevant information would not only enable the decision maker to form a more resilient estimate of the probability, but would also refine and, thus, modify the content of the proposition in question. The decision maker would be forced to
revise the proposition in question by ascribing the probability to a more refined factual proposition, which would be a new proposition, altogether different from the proposition initially considered. The decision maker would
have to continue with this refinement process as the flow of information
continues. In the end, she would determine the most elaborate proposition
allowed by the information at her disposal. This proposition would be considerably more detailed and case-specific than the proposition originally examined. It would be more resilient and, therefore, less likely to be shaken
by potential additions to its informational base. The probability estimate of
this proposition would also come close to certainty.
This point requires some concretization. Let us assume that with regard
to a tennis match played in good weather between A and B, we have been
asked to assess the probability of A's victory. We have been given no information about A's and B's capacities as tennis players, and the outcome of
the match is being kept secret. It is, I think, obvious that we will adequately
discharge our task by assigning to A's victory a non-resilient probability of
0.5. A far more interesting question is whether this estimate of equiprobability can ever become resilient.
Let me now add the following to our original stock of information:
(1) A and B played 10 matches in the past, of which 5 were won by A and 5 by B.
(2) Both A and B were in excellent form shortly before the match in question.

This addition of relevant information certainly makes the assignment of
a 0.5 probability to A's victory more resilient. 24 To maintain accuracy in our
probability assignment, we now also have to modify the proposition in
question. Our new assignment of probability no longer relates to A and B
23
24

See Cohen, supra note 12 at 104-109.
Compare P. Gardenfors & N.E. Sahlin, 'Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking and Decision Making' (1982) 53 Synthese 361 (using an identical example to distinguish between
'risk of error' and 'epistemic risk').
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as totally unknown players. It relates to A and B as players in excellent form
who have shown equal strength in the past, which is an altogether new
proposition. Although more resilient than its predecessor, this assignment
of probability is still deficient on the resiliency score. This deficiency is
predicated on the absence of case-specific information shedding light on
the match in question.
Let me now add a further item to our stock of infonnation:
(3) Shortly before the match, B appearednervous and his leg slightly injured.

This addition allows us to raise the probability of A's victory from 0.5 to 0.6.
As with the previous set of additional information, we are now required to
introduce further refinement into the examined proposition. There is,
however, still a problem with resiliency because we have no relevant information about the match itself. The match was an individual event that must
have been won by either A or B, and we need some information on that
score as well in order to make our probability estimate more resilient. Let
me therefore add the following information about the match:
(4) A won the first set againstB and was leading in the second.
(5) At that stage, B's injured leg began to cause him pain.
(6) B appearedvery nervous, at times devastated, and lost his temper in two encounters with the umpire.

This information certainly makes our probability estimate sufficiently resilient. Concurrently, it requires that we raise the probability of A's victory
from 0.6 to a level close to certainty. It also requires that we further refine
the examined proposition. We no longer are talking about 'two equal players, A and B, playing against each other in good weather and in excellent
form, subject to B's minor injury.' We have added to these facts A's interim
score, as well as the aggravation of B's injury and his subsequent agitation.
Once again, our previous proposition is transformed into an altogether new
proposition that covers more particularities of the case at hand. Adherence
to a strict resiliency standard makes this adjustment process both inevitable
and desirable. Under such a standard, middle-range probability estimates
made in relation to individual events will never be sufficiently resilient.
B. The Low-Weight Probability Problem
This point has important implications for civil trials, where the 'more probable than not' standard allows reliance on middle-range probabilities in relation to individual events. The wording of this standard displays indifference towards the resiliency problem, which may suggest that adjudicators
should do the same. This suggestion, however, adopts a rather narrow view
as to what is required by the law. Ignoring the resiliency factor will not make
the resiliency problem disappear. Reasons for being sceptical about non-resilient probabilities do not weaken simply because they are kept out of
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sight. These reasons must be seriously considered. Their role in adjudicative fact-finding must be determined. If the existing standard of proof does
not determine this role, it must be determined by other legal principles or
policies.
A choice between the aleatory and the inductivist modes of reasoning is,
therefore, pivotal to understanding and administering the law of evidence. 2 5 As such, this choice has engendered a lasting and lively controversy
in the legal literature, known as 'the probability debate.'2 6 Focusing on both
important and unimportant issues, 2 7' 28 this debate has been framed and

25

26

27

Under another approach, facts should be detemlined holistically by evaluating the relative plausibility of the competing stories brought forth by the plaintiff and by the defendant. There are indications that this approach is being adopted in positive law: see, e.g.,
Old Chiefv. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). According to the most sophisticated version of this approach, plausibility of competing stories is not just a matter of their inner
coherence, but also of probabilities and evidential credentials. See R.J. Allen, 'Factual
Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence' (1994) 88 N.W.U.L. Rev. 604. This brings us back
to the problems discussed in this essay. Yet another approach allows fact-finders to establish facts by their subjective experience-based beliefs. This approach does away with the
justification requirement and thus allows liberties and properties to be taken away fi'om
people on the basis of whim and vogue. For this reason alone, I believe it should be
rejected. See Stein, supra note 4 at 310-12.
For a brief survey of this debate, see W.L. Twining & A. Stein, Evidence and 'roo[f The InternationalLibrary of Essays in Law & Legal Theory, AREAS, vol. 11 (New York: New York University Press, 1992), xxi-xxiv; xxvii, note 54. For the latest symposium, see (1997) 1 Int.J.
Evidence & Proof 253-360.
One issue receiving an undtue amount of attention is known as 'tle conjunction paradox.' If, in order to succeed in a lawsuit, the plaintiff has to prove two mutually independent propositions A and B, it would not suffice for her to establish that the probability of A and that of B equal 0.7. Under the conjunction rule, the overall probability of
the plaintiff's case would amount to 0.49, which falls below the preponderance-of-theevidence standard. This strikingly counter-intuitive outcome is intended to demonstrate
that it would be anomalous to base judicial fact-finding upon mathematical calcults of
chances. See L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) at
58-62. This paradox is fictitious. A distinction needs to be made between eleinentalprpositions (such as formation of a contract, its breach by the defendant, and the ensuing
damage) and interimnediarypropositions(such as those that specify the terms of the transaction offered by the plaintiff and the defendant's acceptance of this offer). Elemental
propositions refer to the lawsuit's constitttive elements, as determined by the controlling substantive law (Hohfeld termed them 'operative facts': see W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions a5 Applied inJudicial Reasoning (New Haven: Yale University Press
1923) at 32-35). Intermediary propositions are propositions which establish elemental
propositions. To establish an elemental proposition, one always needs more than one
intermediary proposition. This distinction needs to be made because the law requires
each elemental proposition to be established separately (by the party [[pol whotn the
burden of proof lies). There is no requirement that the conjunction of the relevant elemental propositions be established as more probable than not. Consider a person who is
seeking a declaratoryjudgment to the effect that there is a binding contract between her
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conducted as a clash between the two modes of reasoning. In a recent article, I have argued that in practical reasoning, to which fact-finding in adjuI have, therefore,
dication belongs, this clash should be treated as spurious.
29
criticized the debate for posing a false dichotomy.
Adopting the terminology offered by Keynes, my argument holds that

28

and another person. The probability of this allegation is subsequently established as
equalling 0.7, and the judgment is rendered as requested. At some later stage, the same
plaintiff comes to court complaining that the contract was breached by the defendant
and requests another declaratory judgment that confirms this new allegation. The judge
finds that the probability of this allegation is 0.7 and awards the plaintiff the requested
judgment. Finally, the plaintiff sues the defendant for damages, and the probability of
her allegations in this lawsuit is also found by the judge to equal 0.7. It seems obvious
that the plaintiff should be awarded recovery, as it should be obvious that she also should
have been awarded recovery if the three issues had been tried together. If the latter had
been the case, the compensatory remedy sought by the plaintiff would have rested upon
two interim declaratory judgments, as described above. Analytically, there would be
three judgments, which combine into one for expediency reasons alone; and because
each judgment stands on its own proof as successfully provided by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff is entitled to the requested series ofjudgments. Hence, if the probability of litigated facts were to be determined mathematically, the conjunction rule would apply to
intermediary propositions only, which is neither paradoxical nor overly demanding.
Compare R. Lempert, 'The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof"
(1986) 66 Boston U. L. Rev. 439 at 452 note 42. Professor Lempert draws a distinction
that is almost identical to mine, but argues that the conjunction paradox still retains its
force because the law's refusal to apply the conjunction rule undermines the decisional
accuracy in the long run. See also M. Bar-Hillel, 'Probabilistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding' (1984) 56 Acta Psychologica 267. To be sure, the law is open to a change that will
require a plaintiff to preponderantly establish the elemental conjunction of her case,
which would, arguably, produce a greater number of correct decisions. If this happens,
however, outcomes reached through application of the conjunction rule will no longer
appear counter-intuitive.
Another paradox, which I also view as spurious, points to the difficulty of combining
mutually corroborating pieces of evidence. This difficulty is related to an analysis of corroboration originally provided by Bernoulli. In that analysis, the probability that witness
A speaks the truth is denoted as fr the probability that witness B speaks the truth is
denoted as q; and the fact-finder's task is to determine the probability that A and B both
speak the truth when they converge in a statement. This probability (w) is equal to pq /
pq + (1-p) (I-q), which demonstrates that the corroboration will not work when either p
or q falls below 0.5. Therefore, when both A and B appear as rather unreliable - one
because of a prior conviction for perjury, the other because of poor eyesight - their testimonies will not corroborate one another, even though they testify independently to the
same facts. If we estimate both p and q as amounting to 0.4, iw would be equal to 0.31.
This reduction of the probative force of mutually corroborating pieces of evidence is
plainly counter-intuitive. See Cohen, supra note 27 at 95-96.
In judicial fact-finding, however, corroboration is employed as a matter of caution
rather than as cumulation. For the proponent of A and B, it would be enough if either
one of these witnesses tells the truth. Therefore, as explicated byJohn Stuart Mill, the
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uncertain reasoning has two separate dimensions, 'probability' and 'weight,'
probability that should interest us is that of the disjunctive inference that either A or B is
a truthful witness. See J.S. Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (London:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1891) at 391. In my example, this probability amounnts to (p+q)(pq), that is, to 0.64 (the co-occurrence probability pq was detracted in order to avoid
double-counting). L.J. Cohen did not ignore this interpretation of the corroboration
notion, although he attributes it, instead of toJohn Stuart Mill, to P. Olof Ekelof, 'Free
Evaluation of Evidence' (1964) 8 Scandinavian Studies in Law 47 at 58 (see Cohen, ibid.
at 99). In Cohen's view, by explaining away the Bernoulli paradox, this interpretation
engenders another difficulty, describable as 'the opposite-direction convergence paradox.' Returning to my example, since both p and q are equal to 0.4, the probability that
A did not tell the truth amounts to 0.6, which holds true also with regard to the probability that B testified untruthfully. Because these latter probabilities are also mutually corroborating, their combined force amounts to 0.84.
This critique is misdirected, for it conflates the tasks faced by a proponent of mutually corroborating pieces of evidence and by the opponent of that evidence. For the proponent of A and B in my example, it would be sufficient to establish that either of those witnesses testified truthfully. For the opponent of this evidence, to establish that either A or B
testified untruthfully would not be sufficient. If one of those witnesses testified truthfully,
the opponent's case will be lost. The opponent's burden is conjunctive in its nature, not disjunctive, as in the proponent's case. The probability of the opponent's case will, therefore,
amount to (1-p)(1-q), that is, to 0.36, not 0.84. For different (and more complex) analyses
of the same problem, see R. Eggleston, 'The Mathematics of Corroboration' [ 1985] Crim.
L. Rev. 640; A.P. Dawid, 'The Difficulty about Conjunction' (1987) 36 The Statistician 91.
Less threatening to the mathematical project on their own terms, other difficulties
and paradoxes have been explained away by numerous writers, most convincingly (in my
opinion) by F. Schoeman, 'Cohen on Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence'
(1987) 54 Phil. Sci. 76. The 'negation rnle paradox' is explained away below: see infra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text. For a plausible solution of the 'prior probability
problem,' which otherwise disturbs the application of Bayes' theorem, see A. Stein,
'Judicial Fact-Finding and the Bayesian Method: The Case for Deeper Scepticism About
their Combination' (1996) 1 Int. J. Evidence & Proof 25 at 36-37, note 25. These problems and their solutions are not specified here because they are only remotely related to
the topic of the present essay.
Broadly speaking, implementation of the mathematical probability principles in
judicial fact-finding is frustrated by (1) lack of credible statistical data, (2) severe computational problems, and (3) moral difficulty in determining a person's liability by framing
him into some statistically significant group of people, which would be especially problematic in criminal cases.
See Tribe, supra n.3;J.J. Thomson, 'Liability and Individualized Evidence' (1986) 49
(3) Law & Contemp. Probs. 199; C.R. Callen, 'Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits
on the Use of Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law' (1982) 57 Indiana L.J. 1. For these reasons and also in order to escape the above-mentioned difficulties and paradoxes, some
supporters of the mathematical project have turned to subjectivist probabilities. See, e.g.,
Robertson & Vignaux, supra n.10. I recently argued that the subjectivist approach is tattological, in the sense that its application can produce no inferential progress. See Stein,
ibid.; A. Stein, 'Bayesioskepticism Justified' (1997) 1 Int.J. Evidence & Proof 339.
29

See Stein, supra note 4 at 299-309.
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and that neither of these dimensions can be neglected. 30 Probability should
reflect the chance that the proposition at hand fits the actual event, which
will be worked out from the existing evidence. The contents of a probability
assessment will, thus, derive from the insides of its informational base. In
terms of its weight or cogency, a probability assessment will be conditioned
upon the size of its informational base. The weight of a probability assessment will be determined by the size of the ground covered by the evidence
- that is, by the extent to which the existing evidence encompasses the facts
necessary for decision. Therefore, probability assessments will vary in their
will be weightier and, correspective weight. Some probability assessments
31
respondingly, more reliable than others.
Neither of these two factors can be ignored in adjudication. To base a
judgment on a probabilistic assessment that does not carry much weight is
obviously risky, even when the probability is high. If constructed on a slim
evidential base, such high probability may be misleading; and as such, it may
lead to a wrong decision. Yet to ignore a substantial probability that rests on
an evidentially deficient base is equally risky. A decision that disregards this
probability is likely to be erroneous. Missing evidence holds a mystery that
may unfold itself in various ways. Both reliance on a low-weight probability
as well as refusal to rely upon it involve risk of error. Because adjudicative
fact-finding cannot be halted in indecision, one of the possible decisions
has to be accorded preference, and any chosen decision will allocate the
risk of error between the parties in dispute.
This point requires elaboration. Scarcity of evidence is a commonplace
phenomenon in practical affairs, and adjudication is no exception in this
respect. In many cases, fact-finders are presented with less evidence than
desired, which does not absolve them from the duty to decide the case one
way or another. Evidence used in practical affairs has to be processed and
evaluated 'as is.' If the evidence is slim, this slimness should be accounted
for in the final judgment. If the probability deriving from a slim evidential
base is substantial, this probability also should be accounted for in the final
judgment. Such an all-things-considered judgment is the very essence of
practical reasoning, an enterprise that seeks the optimal decision in a
world of imperfect information. In the trial context, the optimal decision
about uncertain facts is that which identifies the risk of error and allocates
30
31

Keynes, supra note 18 at 71-77.
Charles Peirce is another source in this connection. He wrote that 'to express the proper
state of belief, not one number but two are requisite, the first depending on the inferred
probability, the second on the amount of knowledge on which that probability is based.'
C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss, eds., Collected Papei of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1932) vol. 2 at 421.
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it in an appropriate way. Risk of error dealt with in adjudication is a risk
that materializes in the form of deprivation of a person's liberty or property. Severity of the loss to be sustained by a litigant upon materialization of
this risk is, therefore, yet another factor that needs to be taken into account. Unlike probability and weight, this factor is not epistemic. Probability and weight epistemically determine the potential error. The risk-of-error factor is determined by a moral assessment of the error's consequences.
Situated in the domain of political morality, this factor ascribes to the final
verdict a distinctively moral and political nature. This nature is not only
moral, but also political, because any verdict, erroneous or not, will forcefully protect the recognized entitlement by directing the coercion mechanism, sponsored by the State, to operate in a particular way and against particular individuals.
To decide in advance that low-weight probabilities, which are otherwise
substantial, will be excluded from consideration is to allocate the risk of error in a way that will not always be desirable. An advance ruling that substantial probabilities alone, irrespective of their weight, will be sufficient for rendering verdicts is equally problematic. This allocation of the risk of error
carries no promise of producing more good than harm. Both of these hardand-fast rules are bound to produce serious damage, which can be avoided
by adopting a more refined approach. This prediction can be substantiated
without difficulty. Each of the above rules offers an epistemically plausible
solution to what it incorrectly identifies as an epistemic problem. The problem at hand is not epistemic. It originates from a slim evidential base that
produces epistemic deficiency, but the latter does not determine the ultimate nature of the problem. If the problem were epistemic, its epistemically
best solution would be to reserve judgment in any case where adequate
knowledge is unavailable. This solution is epistemically more accurate than
any other solution to the problem. It is not, however, allowed by the law.
Thus, the ultimate nature of the problem at hand is determined by the requirement that does not allow fact-finders to treat epistemic deficiency as
grounds for not deciding a case. Forthrightly contradicting the epistemological principle that requires a person to withhold judgment in the absence of adequate knowledge, this requirement is not surprising. In the trial
context, to withhold judgment (or, more accurately, to withhold the judgment) by not deciding the case is to uphold the status quo ante,which is tantamount to making a substantive decision. Allocation of the risk of error under uncertainty therefore cannot be avoided. Situated in the domain of
political morality, allocation of this risk can be made only on moral
grounds. Rules driven by epistemic concerns, which either discard lowweight probabilities or accept any substantial probability, regardless of its
weight, have no moral bite. As such, they bite the wrong apple.
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C. Allocating the Risk of Error
In criminal trials, low-weight probabilities do not warrant conviction even
when they are very high. There is, however, no reason for not allowing them
to work in favour of the accused even when they are not very high. This approach is squarely aligned with the 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' requirement, which protects the accused from wrongful conviction. 32 In civil
trials, things are more complex. If plaintiffs were to be allowed to recover
upon low-weight probabilities surpassing the 0.5 threshold, many individual
verdicts granting recovery would be erroneous. This provides a reason for
protecting defendants from such verdicts. At the same time, by systematically allowing recovery on probabilities greater than 0.5, the legal system would
be maximizing the total amount of correct decisions in the long run. This
outcome would be attained with weighty and with low-weight probabilities
alike. Systematic reliance upon probabilities grounded on slim databases
would randomize the error. By interchangeably favouring plaintiffs and defendants, missing information would, therefore, be responsible, in the long
run, for two types of error that would cancel each other out. This long-run
utility would be attained at the expense of accuracy in individual cases. Individual accuracy can be furthered by relying upon weighty probabilities
alone. The legal system may, however, still opt for long-run utility, either in
general or, more feasibly, in specified areas of the law. 33 Adoption of this approach or, alternatively, its rejection both will derive from the moral stance
taken by the system with regard to the risk of error.
More fundamentally, to discard a low-weight probability because too
much evidence is missing is to exert bias against one of the litigants by treating the missing evidence problem as belonging peculiarly to him. In a system committed to extending litigants equal concern and respect, there is
no room for such bias. The system's regret with regard to money wrongfully
taken away from plaintiffs and from defendants should be the same in both
cases. Consequently, a party whose allegations are more probable than
those of her opponent should prevail, even when the probability's weight is
low. 34 Generally, a party should not suffer from missing evidence more than
her opponent. The missing evidence can be blamed on one of the parties
32
33

34

See Stein, supra note 4 at 323-33.
See, e.g., D. Kaye, 'The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:Justifiably
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation' [1982] American Bar Found. Res.J.
487.
See Stein, supra note 4 at 333-37. My discussion presupposes a 'winner-takes-all' system
for resolving disputes, which has been generally adopted. An alternative approach is to
apportion the litigated good in accordance with the probabilities supporting each party's
case. For a discussion of the two approaches that favours the conventional 'winner-takesall' system, see infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
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only upon finding him peculiarly responsible for the loss of evidence. Such
responsibility may be ascribed to a party for withholding evidence, for phys35
ically destroying it, or for otherwise making the trial database deficient.
Apart from this and other special cases, a low-weight probability surpassing
the 0.5 threshold should be generally allowed to tilt the scales.
Phrased in exclusively probabilistic terms, the civil standard of proof contains no explicit requirement with regard to evidential weight. The same
holds true with regard to Anglo-American cases that have applied this standard. In some cases, low-weight probabilities have been relied upon, and the
problem of weight has been bypassed. 36 To infer from these cases that the
problem of weight is treated as a non-problem obviously would be premature. An intellectual detour must not be mistaken for an affirmative statement on the issue. In other cases, hostility has been exhibited towards naked
statistical evidence, which indicates an implicit concern about evidential
weight. 37 Dicta pointing in this direction have not, however, hardened into
bright-line rules. It is both obvious and settled that a sufficiently high probability will bring victory to its proponent when it carries adequate weight. It
is also obvious that a plaintiff will not be awarded recovery when her allegations are not more probable than not, even if they stand on a relatively solid
evidential platform. The less obvious remains unsettled and awaits determination. Mute with regard to the weight requirement, the law takes no stand
on the issue posed by low-weight probabilities surpassing the 0.5 threshold.
This issue can be settled in a principled fashion or on an ad hoc basis. Regardless of the chosen strategy, any resolution of this issue will have to account for all factors relevant to the allocation of the risk of error. Allocation
of the risk of error will have to consider the equality demands. It also will involve valuation of the long-run utilitarian gains, which are attainable
through systematic reliance upon probabilities greater than 0.5, irrespective
of their weight. Additionally, it will have to account for the possibility of
35
36

37

See Porat & Stein, supra note 6. See also DA. Nance, 'Evidential Completeness and the
Burden of Proof' (1998) Hastings L.J. (forthcoming).
See, e.g., Rose v. Abbey Orchard Property Investments Ply. Ltd., [1987] Aust. Torts Rep. 80
(N.S.W. CA.), discussed by KJ. Carruthers, 'Some Observations on the Standard of
Proof in Marine Insurance Cases, with Special Reference to the 'Popi M' Case' (1988) 62
A.L.J. 199 at 207-208, and by D.H. Hodgson, 'The Scales of Justice: Probability and
Proof in Legal Fact-finding' (1995) 69 A. L.J. 731 at 738. See also The Brimnes Tenax
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. (honers of the motor vessel Brimnes, [ 1974] 3 All E.R. 88 at 100g-j, 114ab, 115j-1 16b (C.A.) and Hodgson, ibid. at 738-39.
See, e.g., Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58 N.E. 2d 754 (1945), critically commented on by D.
Shaviro, 'Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice' (1989) 103
Harv. L. Rev. 530. For references to further cases, see M. Dant, 'Gambling on the Truth:
The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability' (1988) 22 Colum. J.
Law & Social Probs. 31 at 31, note 1.
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holding one of the parties responsible for the missing information. 38 Finally,
due regard will have to be paid to the specifics of the case at hand. Verdicts
resting upon low-weight probabilities can develop statistically stratified settings, which the law will process identically. Apart from causing injustice in
individual cases, this can produce improper behavioural incentives and unjust enrichment. These problems obviously need to be taken into account.
Made under the umbrella of the civil standard of proof, decisions considering these factors will go far beyond applying this standard. Such decisions are bound to be substantive decisions because allocation of the risk of
error is a substantive matter. 39 In this area of risk-allocation, an important
distinction needs to be drawn between litigation arising from non-consensual events, broadly taken as torts, and litigation involving consensual relationships, which are based upon contracts. Equality demands will operate in
tort and in contract cases alike. Attaining utility (in terms of wealth-maximization) might also become a preferred objective in both areas of the law.
The responsibility for missing evidence in contract cases will, however, be
allocated differently than in torts. In contractual relationships, factual uncertainty can be both reduced and regulated bilaterally. This objective can
be attained by advance stipulations and documentation. Uncertainty can be
reduced substantially by documents that specify the facts underlying the
transaction and that provide a detailed account of the parties' mutual obligations. Parties anticipating litigation also may agree on a tie-breaking rule
by which any dispute between them will be resolved in the event of factual
impasse. An agreement to this effect may be implicit, although it is far more
preferable to have it in an explicit form. This implies that allocation of the
risk of error in contract litigation depends on the interpretation of the individual contract. Because the latter activity is both costly and perspectival,
it increases litigation costs without eliminating the ambiguities. Appropriate incentives therefore should be set by the law to impel inclusion of contractual stipulations on the issue, which should be both explicit and documented. These incentives would substitute high litigation costs with
relatively low costs of negotiation. The required incentives should be provided by default rules containing a penalty for non-stipulation. A number of
existing contract law doctrines, namely, the 'parol evidence doctrine' and
the contra proferentem principle, can be activated for this very purpose. Parties to a contractual relationship would thus assume responsibility for what
can be described as evidential damage. If both parties are equally responsible (or equally non-responsible) for that damage, the damage should affect
38
39

See Porat & Stein, supra note 6.
The inevitability of such decisions has additional implications for evidence law. See
Stein, supra note 4, at 317-18 and 322-42.
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them equally. A low-weight probability favouring the allegations brought by
the plaintiff would, consequently, allow the plaintiff to recover. If one of the
parties is particularly responsible for that damage, the risk of error should
fall solely upon that party.
These penalty-default rules should be applicable only in cases where litigation involving uncertainty could be anticipated at the time of entering
into the agreement. This will happen in many cases, but certainly not in all
of them. Litigation involving contracts by which factual impasse could not
be regulated in advance should be controlled by the regular 'proof on a balance of probabilities' requirement. This requirement mirrors the agreement that would have been reached in the vast number of cases. Most people would agree in advance to give preference to the more probable over
the less probable. The 'proof on a balance of probabilities' requirement
thereby saves the transaction costs associated with negotiating and writing
the requirement into the contract. Application of this requirement invokes
the contingency problem, which is predicated upon scarcity of evidence.
When this problem is not amenable to contractual regulation, its solution
must be found in principles and policies other than penalty defaults. These
principles and policies are also considered below.
The same contemplation-based approach holds true with regard to the
tie-breaking rules that allocate the burden of persuasion between the contracting parties. These rules place the burden upon the plaintiff to preponderantly establish the alleged breach of contract and charge the defendant
with the same burden with regard to any defence he might raise. These rules
should be explained by the liability expectation and the expectation of release. Liability is typically not contemplated by the contracting parties for
cases where it is not preponderantly clear that the contract was breached.
For cases of breach, there is a presumption of liability: release from contractual liability typically is not contemplated for exemptions (such as mistake
or frustration) that are not preponderantly probable. This hypothetical bargaining is mirrored by the burden-allocating default provisions.
In tort cases, factual uncertainty is not amenable to advance bilateral
regulation. Tortious events are usually accidental and never emanate from
coordinated behaviour between the tortfeasor and the victim. These factors
do not exclude liability for evidential damage when this damage is inflicted
by the tortfeasor or is self-inflicted by the victim. 40 But these factors do exclude the possibility of using contractual incentives as a means of controlling factual uncertainties. Allocation of the risk of error in tort cases should
be directed towards the optimal promotion of the substantive policies of the
40

See Porat & Stein, supra note 6.
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law of torts, such as deterrence and corrective justice. 41 This approach
should be qualified by the litigation costs problem and has a number of other important ramifications, which I will not discuss. The merits, shortcom42
ings, and ramifications of this approach have been examined elsewhere.
This essay focuses upon contract litigation alone, and it is to this type of litigation that I now turn.
The ensuing discussion will link the points made above to a number of
evidentiary problems arising at common law. This will be accomplished
through an examination of a landmark decision of the House of Lords concerning the nature of the burden of proof that needs to be discharged by
the plaintiff in marine insurance litigation. Given in 1985 in a fiercely litigated case, Rhesa Shipping (H.L.), 43 this decision exhibits simultaneously all
the issues that bear upon allocation of the risk of error in contract cases. In
addition, this decision has become a textbook authority on the burden of
proof doctrine, 44 as had been predicted to occur. 45 In what follows, I will examine and criticize one of the principles laid down in Rhesa, namely, the
holding that an abstract possibility, however probable it may be, cannot
help the plaintiff in discharging the burden of proof. Hostile to what can be
described as 'naked probability,' this holding violates the equality in the allocation of the risk of error between the plaintiff and the defendant. This
holding is at odds also with the expectation interest, which is generally protected by the law of contracts. Apart from this, it clashes with two important
policies of contract law and the law of insurance. It fails to provide the right
incentive for the parties to an insurance contract to resolve contractually
the problem of uncertain losses. This incentive could foster certainty in the
insured-underwriter relationship and, thus, save unnecessary litigation
costs. Finally, the holding in Rhesa distorts allocation of liability in insurance
cases as a mechanism for spreading the costs of accidents.
III RHESA: The Facts and the Holding
The plaintiffs' ship, insured with the defendants against 'perils of the seas'
and 'negligence of the crew,' sank in the Mediterranean. She sank along
with most of the evidence pertaining to her seaworthiness and to the cause
41

42
43

Ibid. The notion that allocation of the risk of error should be tied to the substantive law
is an old idea, pioneered by the father of the modem law of evidence, James Bradley
Thayer. See A. Stein, 'Allocating the Burden of Proof in Sales Litigation: The Law, Its
Rationale, a New Theory, and Its Failure' (1996) 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 335.
See Porat & Stein, supra note 6.
Supra note 8. Litigation at the Commercial Court and the Court of Appeals preceded
this decision. See Edmunds (Commercial Court) and Rhesa Shipping (CA.), ibid.
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of the accident. The plaintiffs, therefore, could not activate the seaworthiness presumption, which usually wins a marine insurance lawsuit based on
a 'perils of the seas' policy if there is no evidence of scuttling.4 6 The defendants, in turn, had no evidence indicating that the ship was unseaworthy. Evidence presented in this case was scanty. It revealed that something had seriously damaged the ship by creating a large aperture in a shell-plating on
her port side. Water had streamed through this aperture into the ship, and
the ship sank as a result of severe flooding. The factor responsible for this
aperture consequently became the contested issue in the ensuing litigation.
Two theories concerning this factor were ruled out by the trial judge as
virtually impossible:
(1) the plaintiffs' theory that the apertureand the consequent loss of the ship resulted
from some negligence of the crew;
(2) the defendants' theory that the ship was unseaworthy.
44

45
46

Rhesa has been cited and followed not only in England, but also in Australia and Canada.
English cases that cite and follow Rhesa include the following (unpublished cases appear
on LEXIS): Re L. (a minor) 1998 (CA.); McGregor v. PrudentialInsurance Co., [1998] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 112; Byrnev. NottinghamshireHealth Authority, 1997 (CA.); Skelton v. Lewisham
and North Southwark Health Authority 1997 (Q.B.D.); Court v. Hunting PaintingConstructors
Limited, 1994 (CA.); Lamb Head Shipping Co. v.Jennings (The 'Marel'), [19941 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 624 (CA.) [hereinafter Lamb Head Shipping Co. (CA.)]; Lamb Head Shipping Co. v.
Jennings (The 'Marel'), [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 402 (Q.B.D.); Watt & Another v. Great
Grimsby Borough Council 1993 (CA.); Romero (tradingas Basildon Waste Paper Company) v.
The Commission for the New Towns 1992, (C.A.); Associated Newspapers PLC. v. Insert Media
Ltd., [1991] 3 All E.R. 535 (CA.); Flatman v. Fisher,Flatman & Anotherv. Excess Insurance
Group Limited 1990 (C.A.); Carterv. Sheath, [1990] R.T.R. 12 (CA.); Worn Polymers Ltd. v.
Bairstow & Bateman Ltd. 1987 (Q.B.D.); Chick v. Powell & Partners 1987 (Q.B.D.); Shackwell Edwards & Co. Ltd. v. Stabilag (Esh) Ltd. 1986 (C.A.); Continental Illinois NationalBank
& Trust Co. of Chicagov. Alliance Assurance Co. Ltd. 1986 (Q.B.D.); CorrugatedSheets & Profiles (H & E) Ltd. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. 1986 (Q.B.D.);
Cronin v. The Mayor and Burgessesof the London Borough of Redbridge 1986 (Q.B.D.); Airways
Pension Fund Trustees Ltd. v. London Demolition (UK) Ltd. 1986 (C.A.)
Australian cases include the following: Thompson v. Government Insurance Office of New
South Wales (1994), N.S.W. LEXIS 12888 (Supreme Court of New South Wales); Raso v.
NRMA InsuranceLtd. (1992), N.S.W. LEXIS 6530 (Supreme Court of New South Wales);
R.W Miller & Co. Pty Ltd. v. Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd. (1992), N.S.W. LEXIS 6938
(Supreme Court of New South Wales); Tasman Inks Pty Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Australia)Pty Ltd.
(1989), TAS. LEXIS 1823 (Supreme Court of Tasmania); GeneralJonesPty Ltd. v. Wildridge
(1988), TAS. LEXIS 1611 (Supreme Court of Tasmania).
Canadian cases include Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nu-Pharm Inc. (1996), 69 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (Fed.
CA.) and C.C.R. FishingLtd.v. Tomenson Inc. (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (B.C. CA.), also
reported in [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 536.
See AA.S. Zuckerman, 'Evidence' [1985] All E.R. Ann. Rev. 155.
On this presumption, see G. Brice, 'Unexplained Losses in Marine Insurance' (1991) 16
Tulane Maritime L.J. 105 at 113-14, 120, 122-23, and 129.
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This left thejudge with two other theories, namely:
(3) the plaintiffs' theory that the aperture was caused by a submerged submarine;
(4) the defe-ndants' theoy that the proximate cause of the aperture was wear and tear.

Evidence supporting these theories could not lift either of them above
the conjectural. Both theories were considered by the judge to be theories
of low probability. The judge found theory (3) more probable than theory
(4). On the basis of this comparative preponderance, he ruled in favour of
the plaintiffs.

47

As remarked by the House of Lords, 48 this finding seems to

have adhered to Sherlock Holmes's notorious precept, pronounced to Dr.
Watson, 'How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?' 49
The finding constituted a plain legal error. Under the preponderanceof-the-evidence standard, the plaintiffs' allegations had to be established as
being 'more probable than not.' In order to succeed, these allegations had
to prevail over any possible account of the events that could favour the defendants. The defendants flatly denied these allegations and were perfectly
entitled to do so. In developing theory (4), they were not endorsing it as
their only voucher. 50 The error committed by the trialjudge initially passed
appellate muster,5 1 but ultimately was rectified by the House of Lords, and
the plaintiffs were denied recovery.
This could be an unquestionably right decision if the plaintiffs had not
put forward another, more promising argument. They submitted that the fatal aperture had been brought about by some unidentified peril of the seas
and that this was the most probable conclusion that could be arrived at on
the basis of the evidence. This argument could be translated into formal
probabilistic terms as referring to the probability of the disjunctive proposition 'either pp, or P2, or P3, or ... p,,,' in which P1, P2, P3 ... and p,, represent
the full set of perils of the seas, both known and unknown. The argument
therefore holds that the probability of event 'P, or P2 or P3 or ... p,,' is greater
than 0.5. Because the plaintiffs were entitled to win the case upon proof of
any member of the p-set, this argument appears sound.5 2 The probability of
many individual p's in the set is unknown. This probability may well be low,
but the probability that one of the p's was responsible for the plaintiffs' loss
47
48
49
50

51

Compare R.J. Allen, 'A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials' (1986) 66 Boston U. L. Rev.
401 (supporting a similar approach on policy grounds).
Rheia Shipping(H.L.), supra note 8 at 718a.
A. Conan Doyle, 'The Sign of Four' in A. Conan Doyle, Sherlock Hotmes: The Complete lttustrated Noveth (London: Chancellor Press, 1987) 109 at 138.
This elementary procedural right was recognized in Theodorou v. Chester [1951] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 204 at 238, and, more recently, in Lamb Head Shipping Co. (CA.), supra note 44 at
627.
Rhesa Shipping (CA.), supra note 8.
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is high enough to tilt the scales in the plaintiffs' favour. Far from implausible
in its own right, this argument was also supported by the judgment of the
Court of Appeal. 3 The House of Lords, however, declined to accept it:
The shipowners could not, in my view, rely on a ritual incantation of the generic expression 'perils of the seas,' but were bound, if they were to discharge
54 successfully
the burden of proof ... to condescend to particularity in the matter.
This ruling clearly indicates that a mere probability favourable to the
plaintiff is not sufficient to grant her recovery. To enable the plaintiff to prevail, probability favouring her case must represent more than sheer chance.
This probability must be attached to some particular account of events that favours the plaintiff. To be valid, this attachment must, of course, be sufficiently
grounded in the evidence. The demand for case-specific evidence covering
the plaintiff's account of events has, therefore, been added to the basic prob55
ability requirement as a firm prerequisite for holding the defendant liable.
IV RHESA: Probability, Weight, and the Risk of Error

In an article that examines the foundations of evidence law, I used the
above twofold requirement for holding defendants liable to exemplify the
distinction between probability and evidential weight.5 6 1also demonstrated
that this distinction is pivotal to understanding evidence law as regulating
judicial reasoning about uncertain events. As already mentioned, this distinction originated in Keynes's Treatise on Probability.57 It was subsequently
52
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54

55
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Compare Hodgson, supra note 36 at 750 (supporting the particularity-of-proof requirement laid down by the House of Lords as 'unexceptionable,' but arguing that 'alternatives on which the plaintiff can succeed can be bracketed').
Rhesa Shipping (CA.), supra note 8, at 558-59 (Sir John Donaldson, M.R.) and at 561
(Lord Justice May).
Rhesa Shipping (H.L.), supra note 8 at 716. This holding echoes Judge Devlin's holding
in Waddle v. IWalhend Shipping Co. (The Hopestar), [1952] 2 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 105 at 106
('in a case where substantially all the facts have been brought to light, it is no doubt legitimate to argue that some cause must be found, and therefore the one that has most to
be said for it should be selected. Where it can fairly be said that all possible causes have
been canvassed, the strongest must be the winner. But in a case where all direct evidence
is missing, there is no ground for saying that the most plausible conjecture must perforce be the true explanation. The answer that may well have to be given is that not
enough is known about the circumstances of the loss to enable the inquirer to say how it
happened.').
By this conditioning of 'large inferences' upon 'small facts', the House of Lords appears
to have subscribed to a different precept of Sherlock Holmes. See Conan Doyle, supra
note 49 at 115-16.
Stein, supra note 4.
See Keynes, sipra note 18.
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refined by L.J. Cohen, a contemporary philosopher of science, 58 and has
59
been invoked, under different terminology, by other philosophers.
In the legal context, this distinction can be presented in its clearest form
by using a hypothetical case, widely known as the 'Gatecrasher Paradox,'
which was constructed by Cohen for different (but related) purposes. In
this hypothetical case, in the words of its constructor,
499 people paid for admission to a rodeo and ... 1,000 are counted on the seats, of
whom A is one. Suppose no tickets were issued and there can be no testimony as to
whether A paid for admission or climbed over the fence. So by any plausible criterion of mathematical probability there is a 0.501 probability, on the admitted facts,
that he did not pay. The mathematicist theory would apparently imply that in such
circumstances the rodeo organizers are entitled to judgment against A for the admission-money, since the balance of probability ... would lie in their favour. But it
seems manifestly unjust that A should lose his case where there is an agreed mathematical probability of as high as 0.499 that he in fact paid for admission. Indeed, if
the organizers were really entitled to judgment against A, they would presumably be
equally entitled to judgment against each person in the same situation as A. So they
must conceivably be entitled to recover 1,000 admission-money, when it was admitted that 499 had actually been paid. The absurd injustice of this suffices to show that
there is something wrong somewhere. But where? 6°
The distinction between probability and weight resolves this paradox.
If the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard were to refer solely to a
probability greater than 0.5, the organizers would, indeed, be entitled to a
verdict against A, however counter-intuitive this may sound. 6 1 This, however, is not the case. The probability that A was a gatecrasher indeed
amounts to 0.501. Yet, similarly to any other probabilistic argument, this
proposition is valid only in the world of its underlying information. The
weight of this proposition is, therefore, contingent upon its informational
base. This base is, undoubtedly, slim, and the weight of the proposition is
correspondingly low. This proposition does not carry much weight because most of the evidence by which it can be verified or refuted is missing.
The weight of this proposition is low for a more specific reason as well.
This proposition can be directed with equal weight against any of the 1000
58

See L.J. Cohen, 'Twelve Questions About Keynes's Concept of Weight' (1985) 37 Brit.J.

59

Phil. Sci. 263; L.J. Cohen, 'The Role of Evidential Weight in Criminal Proof' (1986) 66
Boston U. L. Rev. 635; Cohen, supra note 12 at 102-109.
See, e.g., Gardenfors & Sahlin, supra note 24; Logue, supra note 20.
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Cohen, supra note 27 at 75.
Sir Richard Eggleston and Professor Glanville Williams did not consider this outcome
counter-intuitive. See R. Eggleston, 'The Probability Debate' [1980] Crim. L. Rev. 678; R.
Eggleston, 'Focusing on the Defendant' (1987) 61 A.L.J. 58; G. Williams, 'The Mathematics of Proof [1979] Crim. L. Rev. 297.
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spectators, of whom 499 are known to have paid for admission. 62 Because
the law can rationally be construed as setting minimal requirements at
both probability and weight levels, the organizers' lawsuit can rationally be
dismissed.63
This two-dimensional reasoning about the strength of probabilistic allegations also explains the outcome reached by the Law Lords in Rhesa Shipping (H.L.). The allegation that the ship's loss had resulted from some peril
of the seas was, indeed, more probable than any other explanation of the
event. This allegation, however, was not sufficiently covered by the evidence. It was supported by the evidence only at the aleatory level, as something worth gambling upon. The allegation was a good gamble only in its
world of limited information, which was patently uninformative. It was only
natural to prefer the stability of the status quo ante over this shaky world,
which explains the Law Lords' decision.
To justify this decision, however, is another, more difficult, matter.
There surely was a quite severe evidential deficiency. The plaintiffs' allegation was, nonetheless, more probable than not under the existing evidence,
and there is nothing to suggest that the plaintiffs were more responsible for
the evidential deficiency than the defendants. 64 In light of this deficiency,
any resolution of the case obviously entails risk of error. This risk has to be
assumed either by the plaintiffs or by the defendants. If so, why should the
plaintiffs be singled out to be the exclusive bearers of this risk, given the
odds that favour them over the defendants? What marks the defendants as
deserving of immunity from this risk, when the odds are not in their favour?
62

In the famous words of Keynes,
As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of the probability of
the argument may either decrease or increase, according as the new knowledge
strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable evidence; but something seems to have
increased in either case, - we have a more substantial basis upon which to rest our conclusion. I express this by saying that an accession of new evidence increases the weight of
an argument. New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an argument, but
it will always increase its 'weight.' [W] eight, to speak metaphorically, measures the sum of
the favourable and unfavourable evidence ... probability measures the difference.
[Emphasis in original.]
- Keynes, supra note 18 at 77, 84.
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By invoking the same strategy, I have explained away a related paradox, known as 'Prisoners in the Yard,' which was devised by Charles Nesson to highlight the problem of
'proof beyond reasonable doubt.' See C. Nesson, 'Reasonable Doubt and Permissive

64

Inferences: The Value of Complexity' (1979) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1187 at 1192-93, and
Stein, supra note 4 at 304, note 115.
For a thesis that liability for uncertainty should tip the scales against the 'evidential tortfeasor,' see Porat & Stein, supra note 6. For a critical appraisal of this thesis, see R.D.
Friedman, 'Dealing With Evidentiary Deficiency' (1997) 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961.
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No ready-made solution to this quandary can be found in the existing
standard-of-proof requirement. Nor is any such solution offered by the rule
placing the persuasion burden on the plaintiff's shoulders. None of these
provisions distinguishes between probability and weight. None of them bars
recovery as was sought by the plaintiffs in Rhesa on the basis of naked probability, nor does any of them warrant this recovery. The solution to this quandary must, therefore, be grounded upon other reasons, namely, those reasons that determine the allocation of the risk of error between plaintiffs and
defendants. These reasons are not readily available. It is, however, already
apparent that they necessarily must assume a distinctively moral, rather than
epistemic, trait. There are no epistemic reasons for resolving the conflict between the plaintiffs and the defendants in Rhesa. All we have is a slim evidential base and the naked probability constructed thereupon. The uncertainty
of the case cannot be reduced any further. Therefore, all that remains to do
is to identify the party who should be charged with the risk of error and, correspondingly, the party who deserves immunity from this risk.65
Framing the issue in this way reveals the untidiness of the Gatecrasher
hypothetical. In the Gatecrasher hypothetical, if the organizers were to be
allowed to recover from A, they also would be allowed to recover from any
other spectator. This outcome certainly would amount to an unjust enrichment of the organizers. To prevent this enrichment, the organizers should
be barred (by estoppel rules or otherwise) from recovering more than 501
admission fees. This, in turn, would allocate liability in a way that is certainly
arbitrary, for there is no evidence that distinguishes between A and his fellow spectators. To make this difficulty more transparent, let it be assumed
that the remaining 999 spectators were impleaded as defendants in A's case.
In a thus modified lawsuit, there could be no non-arbitrary verdict that
principled
would prevent the unjust enrichment of the organizers. The only
66
verdict would be one that holds each of the spectators liable.
The Gatecrasher hypothetical was designed to present a set-up that highlights the anomalies that would be produced by groundingjudicial verdicts
upon naked statistics. 67 To be paradigmatic, any such set-up should be constructed by postulating conditions where all other factors are equal. In the
Gatecrasher hypothetical, all other factors are not equal, which makes the
hypothetical unsuitable as a paradigm.
65

See generally Stein supra note 4 at 296-342.

66

The only way to prevent unjust enrichment in this case is to hold each of the spectators

liable for 0.501 of the admission fee. Not allowed by the law, such an allocation of liability will certainly be wrong in every single case. See Stein, supra note 4 at 335-36. See also
infra notes 119-126 and accompanying text.

67

See Cohen, supra note 27 at 76-81.

AN ESSAY ON UNCERTAINTY AND FACT-FINDING IN CIVIL LITIGATION

327

The set-tip unfolded in Rhesa does not suffer from this predicament. In
this case, as already mentioned, the proposition that the ship's loss had resulted from some unidentified peril of the seas was held to be of no benefit
to the plaintiffs, even though it was more probable than not. This threshold
dismissal of the proposition turned the case into a neat example of naked
statistics. Judicial acceptance of this proposition entailed no adverse side-effects for the administration of the law. There was no complaint that the
plaintiffs had failed to discharge their uberrimaefideiduties prior to or during the execution and performance of their insurance contract. Nor was
there a complaint attributing to the plaintiffs a withholding or destruction
of evidence. The relevant evidence simply sank together with the ship, and
it was too expensive to tow it to the surface.
There is, of course, a general pragmatic concern that the Law Lords
might have had in mind, but did not address explicitly. To maintain no minimal threshold requirement with regard to evidential weight - so that plaintiffs are allowed to recover from defendants on the basis of naked statistics
- is to invite a manipulative framing of the evidential base to the advantage
of the manipulator. This concern, however, is too general and has no special implications for the problem at hand. The manipulation problem hovers over litigation just as in any other setting that involves people, money,
greed and uncertainty. Making the standard of proof more demanding (by
imposing a ban on low-weight probabilities, or otherwise) will not prevent
fabrication and lies. Nor will it induce a self-serving litigant to seek evidence
when the effort is costly and holds no definite promise of forensic reward.
It also cannot be expected to impel a litigant to come forth with unfavourable evidence, instead of withholding it. A Holmsean 'bad man' can be expected to work for the truth only when he expects the truth to work for him.
This problem persists in every evidential set-up, and there is no reason to
believe that it would become more acute if plaintiffs were allowed to recover
on naked statistics. Quite to the contrary: naked statistical inferences deriving
from a manufactured evidential base can be counteracted more easily than
case-specific lies. The thinner the base upon which such inferences are constructed, the easier it becomes to whittle them down. Not resilient to change
in their evidential environment, such inferences are liable to be destroyed by
virtually any case-specific evidence that supports their opponent's case. Apart
from that, a plaintiff resting her case upon naked statistics will expose herself
to the charge of withholding case-specific evidence. If found justified, this
charge will activate sanctions for foiling discovery, as well as adverse inferences against the plaintiff.68 In lawsuits founded upon naked statistics, this
68

D. Kaye, 'The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land' (1979) 47 U. Chicago L. Rev.
34 at 40.
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charge is self-inviting and, therefore, likely to be invoked against any plaintiff.
Unwilling to expose herself to this charge, the average plaintiff will tend not
69
to withhold case-specific evidence, so long as it does not subvert the lawsuit.
The average plaintiff also will make efforts to obtain case-specific evidence, if
she expects it to support the lawsuit and if the costs of obtaining it are not prohibitive relative to its probative potential. Therefore, a large number of plaintiffs suing upon naked statistical evidence would be suing upon it out of sheer
necessity. They certainly would be joined by malafidei plaintiffs, who conceal
unfavourable evidence, and it would not be easy to distinguish between the
two groups of plaintiffs and to identify to which of the two groups an individual plaintiff belongs. Because malafideiplaintiffs always tend to conceal unfavourable evidence, a rule prohibiting recovery upon naked statistics (or upon
low-weight probabilities in general) would be unlikely to increase the flow of
probative evidence into courtrooms. At the same time, this rule would unjustly penalize deserving plaintiffs.
Actions grounded upon naked statistics might still be dismissed as unsubstantiated as a matter of principle. This seems to have been the fate of
the plaintiffs' allegation in Rhesa, which was dismissed by the House of
Lords despite its favourable odds. The definitive rhetoric employed in this
connection by the Law Lords lends strong support to this interpretation of
their decision. The plaintiffs' action ultimately was dismissed because it was
tounded on an abstract probability not anchored in any specific evidence.
Its dismissal allocated the risk of error in a way that required justification,
but which the Law Lords failed to provide. Can this required justification,
nonetheless, be found elsewhere? To this issue I now turn by discussing the
relevant principles and policies of the law.
V The Equality Principle

Grounded upon political morality, the equality principle requires the State
to treat all citizens with equal concern and respect.70 The same requirement applies to the State when it acts through its courts as an arbiter of civil
69

70

In the final analysis, evidence unfavourable to its possessor can be extracted only
through discovery, when it has enough legal force, and not by adverse presumptions or
inferences. This point should be obvious: production of unfavourable evidence usually
entails certain loss on the issue, while potential exposure to an adverse presumption or
inference would involve only a probable loss. See Stein, supra note 41 at 336-38. The
same applies to lies, mutatis mutandis. Lies can be tackled effectively only when they are
tackled directly - that is, by cross-examination, by evidence that refutes them, and by
penalties for perjury.
See Dworkin, supra note 9 at chs. 3 & 4; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (London: Fontana
Press, 1986) at chs. 6 & 7.
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disputes and thus forces its dispute-resolving decisions upon litigants. Losses undeservedly sustained by the plaintiff and by the defendant should,
therefore, be regarded as equally regrettable. Consequently, risk of error in
civil litigation should be allocated equally between the parties. It should be
71
allocated in a way that does not favour one party over his or her opponent.
The ideal implementation of the equality principle would require that
each party be awarded the value of his or her case. A plaintiff, therefore,
would recover from the defendant a sum of money equalling PD, when P
represents the probability of the plaintiffs allegations and D represents the
value of the litigated good. The sum amounting to (1-P)D accordingly
would go to the defendant. Under this approach, pursuit of equality in the
allocation of the risk of error would acquire independent significance.
Equality would be pursued for its own sake, regardless of the demands set
by the substantive law. This approach breaks away from the notion of adjectivity that lies at the heart of the burden of proof doctrine and subordinates
the doctrine, together with other procedural and evidentiary arrangements, to the substantive law and its underlying objectives.
This approach frustrates the primary purpose of the law of evidence and
procedure, namely, the implementation of the substantive law.72 In virtually
every legal system, the substantive law structuresjudicial decisions by prescribing a framework of strictly dichotomous legal categories, such as 'contract/
no-contract,' 'tort/no-tort,' 'will/no-will,' and so forth. 73 Any such law requires judges to adjudicate cases in an all-or-nothing fashion. In a breach-ofcontract lawsuit, for example, ajudge has to determine whether or not a contract was made; whether or not it was breached; whether or not it was frustrated; whether or not its conditions are illegal, and so forth. More nuanced doctrines - such as those that apportion liability for damage by accounting for the
71

72
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For detailed discussion of this principle, see Stein, supra note 4 at 333-42. See also J.
Brook, 'Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil Litigation' (1982) 18 Tulsa L.J. 79 at 85; R.J. Allen, 'Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Modem Legal Discourse' (1994) 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 627 at 634; D.
Hamer, 'The Civil Standard of Proof Uncertainty: Probability, Belief andJustice' (1994)
16 Sydney L. Rev. 506 (all explaining allocation of the persuasion burden by the equality
principle).
This instrumentalist conception is, of course, closely associated with Bentham. See G.
Postema, 'The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's Theory of Adjudication' (1977) 11 Georgia L. Rev. 1393. See, however, R. Summers, 'Evaluating and
Improving Legal Process -A Plea for "Process Values"' (1974) 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1; and
M.D. Bayles, 'Principles for Legal Procedure' (1986) 5 Law & Phil. 33 (ascribing intrinsic
value to certain procedural arrangements).
Dworkin termed such categories 'dispositive concepts' because the law requires judges
to dispose cases only through these categories. See R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) at ch. 5.
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parties' comparative fault - operate in a similar way. For example, in applying
the comparative fault doctrine, ajudge has to determine whether or not the
plaintiff was at fault - that is, whether or not the plaintiff negligently contributed to the occurrence of the litigated damage or negligently failed to mitigate it. Although this and affiliated doctrines allow apportionment of liability
for damage, the fault activating these doctrines always has to be determined
in an all-or-nothing fashion. Judges, for instance, are not allowed to hold a
plaintiff responsible for 40 per cent of the litigated damage upon finding a
0.4 probability that the damage was self-inflicted. If there is a 0.6 probability
that the damage was caused by the defendant, the defendant should be held
liable for the entire damage. Under this framework, risk of error attendant
upon determination of factual issues that pertain to a single legal category
cannot be equitably divided between the parties. If the equality principle were
unrelated to the substantive law, it could prescribe equitable sharing of this
risk by allowing a plaintiff to recover from the defendant in proportion to the
probability of the plaintiffs case. However, as part of the law of evidence and
procedure, which combine into an inherently adjective mechanism aimed at
implementing the substantive law, the equality principle cannot acquire such
autonomy. It therefore must be applied differently. Unauthorized to divide
the risk of error with regard to an indivisible legal category, it is bound to
place the entire risk upon one of the parties. Under this constraint, the plaintiff and the defendant will be treated as equals in the sense that neither of
them will be accorded preference over the other in factual findings unless his
(or her) case is supported by better reasons. A party whose factual allegations
are supported by weaker reasons will, consequently, bear the risk of error.
Hence, a party will prevail in the entire case when his or her allegations are
more probable than not.
This allocation of the risk of error does not yet provide a tie-breaking
rule for balanced cases. A possible rule for such cases would be one that requires a plaintiff to prove her entire case by a preponderance of the evidence ('the P>0.5 rule' 74). If the plaintiff fails to discharge this burden, she
will not be allowed to recover from the defendant. From a utilitarian perspective, this rule is certainly desirable. It would discourage unmeritorious
lawsuits and thus save litigation costs. It would reduce the number of verdicts that require enforcement, thus saving enforcement costs. It also would
acknowledge that for the average person, 'taking' is more harmful than
'not giving' because bottom dollar is of greater value to a person than top
dollar. 75 This saving of auxiliary costs arguably should be opted for when
the probabilities are equal. For such cases, the equality principle prescribes
74

This shorthand expression should not be perceived as suggesting that judges should
determine facts by resorting to mathematical probabilities.
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indifference in regard to the primary cost of error, irrespective of whether
this cost is to be sustained by the plaintiff or by the defendant. In view of
this indifference, a decision rule saving auxiliary costs associated with litigation should be welcomed.
This primafacie appealing argument is flawed in one important aspect.
From the equality perspective, a saving of auxiliary costs should be opted for
not when the probabilities are equal, but when everything is equal. In the
present case, the probabilities are equal, but everything else is not. Because
the P>0.5 rule systematically favours defendants over plaintiffs in connection76
with any given issue that arises in litigation, it violates the equality principle.
The equality principle therefore cannot embrace this rule. Because it cannot
embrace this rule, the equality principle allocates risk of error also by dividing
the discrete legal categories, which pertain to specified classes of cases, between
plaintiffs and defendants. As a result of this division, facts relevant to a legal
category that is to the benefit of plaintiffs have to be established by the plaintiff as more probable than not. Facts pertaining to a category that benefits defendants have to be established by the defendant at the same level of probability. Consequently, each litigant is exposed to the risk of error in relation to
his own allegations- that is, only in relation to the facts making out his case under the controlling substantive law. For example, in a breach-of-contract lawsuit, the plaintiff has to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that she and
the defendant entered into a contract, that the contract was breached by the
defendant and that she sustained losses as a result of this breach. The defendant, in turn, will have to preponderantly establish mistake, misrepresentation,
frustration, or any other defence he might raise in order to absolve himself
from contractual liability. 77 Risk of error thus will be allocated between the
parties in a roughly equal fashion.
Under this framework, the plaintiffs in Rhesa ought to have been granted
recovery upon proof on a balance of probabilities that their damage resulted from some unidentified peril of the seas. There was no reason for holding them more responsible than the defendants for the scarcity of evidence.
75
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See R.K. Winter, 'The Jury and the Risk of Non-Persuasion' (1971) 5 Law & Soc'y Rev.
335 at 337; R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Laug 4th ed. (Boston & Toronto: Little,
Brown & Co., 1992) at 552; Stein, supra note 41 at 340-43.
It may be adopted only on utilitarian grounds. See infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
The persuasion burden is, indeed, allocated by the law in this way. See Joseph Constantine
Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd., [1941] 2 All E.R. 165 (H.L.); A.
Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence, 4th ed. (London: Butterworth, 1996) at 69-70 (for
England); J. Sopinka, S. N. Lederman & A. W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada
(Toronto & Vancouver: Butterworth, 1992) at 59 (for Canada); McCormick, supra note
1 at 427-32 (for the United States).
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This scarcity should not have worked more to the plaintiffs' detriment than
to the detriment of the defendants. Risk of error attendant upon this scarcity should have been shared equally by the parties. As a consequence, the
plaintiffs' probabilistic advantage should have tilted the scales to their benefit.
As dictated by the equality principle, this approach to risk-allocation also
benefits defendants. Indeed, a defendant underwriter contending that a
vessel insured against perils of the seas was scuttled also will not be required
to come forth with specific evidence demonstrating the exact way in which
scuttling occurred.78 The same holds true with regard to any exception to
the insurance coverage. Any such exception can be activated only upon determination of its underlying facts as more probable than not.79 This burden can be discharged more easily under the equality principle. An abstract
possibility favouring the defendant's case will suffice in this area as well, so
long as it can be shown to be more probable than not.
VI The ExpectationPrinciple

In some contract cases, scarcity of evidence that produces irreducible uncertainty in litigation is anticipated and regulated by the contract. Parties to
a contract may explicitly stipulate the rule by which any future litigation that
might arise between them will be settled under uncertainty. They also may
80
agree that certain facts will be deemed true absent proof to the contrary
They may even agree that certain facts or documents will be deemed irrebuttably true, so that no proof to the contrary ever will be allowed. Finally,
an agreement may stipulate that facts pertaining to future disputes between
the parties will be provable only by certain specified documents. Stipulation
to this effect shields the parties from the uncertainty involved in witness accounts, which might be inaccurate and even perjurious. In the absence of
such stipulations, uncertainties are handled by the rules furnished by the
law, namely, by the burden of proof and 'parol evidence' doctrines. 81 These
doctrines supply standard decisions for uncertain situations. In the present
context, they can be viewed as and are often labelled 'default rules.' Parties
78

79
.80
81

It is assumed that the burden of establishing scuttling is placed on the underwriter,
which is not a clear-cut principle. See Compania Naviera Vascongada v. British and Foreign
Marine Insurance Company (1936), 54 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 35 at 50-51; Palamisto General
EnterprisesSA v. Ocean Marine Insurance Co., [1972] 2 Q.B. 625 at 636 (CA.); MA. Clarke,
The Law ofInsurance Contracts,2d ed. (London: Lloyds of London Press, 1994) at 372-75.
Clarke, ibid. at 372.
See, e.g., Levy v. Assicurazioni Generali, [1940] 3 All E.R. 427; Spinney's (1948) Ltd. v. Royal
Insurance Co. Ltd., [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 406.
See Clarke, supra note 78 at 317-19.
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content with these doctrines can incorporate them into their contract by silence, without incurring transaction costs. Parties adverted to the problem
of uncertainty and unwilling to embrace its default rule solution are left free
to agree upon their own solution for the problem. They should, indeed, be
expected to make such an agreement when the benefits accruing from their
special regulation of uncertainties are likely to exceed the costs of negotiating and drafting the terms of that regulation.
This dichotomous depiction of contractual regulation of uncertainties
(as oscillating between explicit stipulations and default rules) does not
present the full picture. There are also special types of contracts that imply
a deviation from the default regulation of uncertainties. An implication to
this effect can be inherent to the nature of the particular contractual relationship as something that 'goes without saying.' Recognized at common
law, this possibility entails the usual problems associated with reading an implied term into a contract. Tojustify imposition of an obligation not explicitly taken upon by the individual is, indeed, most problematic. Any such imposition clashes with individual autonomy, invokes paternalism and is often
at odds with economic efficiency.82 Due to these problems,judgments that
have recognized the implied-term possibility have been pragmatically bonded to their factual patterns and have avoided pronouncing hard-and-fast
83
rules. One general principle, which I will call 'the expectation principle,'
is, however, clearly discernible from these judgments. Under this principle,
allocation of the risk of error is to be determined by interpreting the contractual exchange of promises between the parties. This principle will now
be articulated.
I will begin the examination of the expectation principle with another
seminaljudgment of the House of Lords, which was delivered in Constantine
(Joseph) Steamship Line Ltd v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd.84 This judgment reaffirmed the well-established principle that the defence of frustration, relied upon by a party seeking to absolve himself from contractual obligations, must be established by that party by a preponderance of the
82

83

84

For both a recent and comprehensive discussion of these problems, see E. Zamir, 'The
Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation' (1997) 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 1710. See also D. Charny, 'Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation' (1991) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815.
This alludes to the 'expectation interest,' generally protected by contract law, which follows the famous taxonomy of L. Fuller & W. Perdue Jr, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages' (1936-37) 46 Yale L.J. 52; 373. For more recent discussions, see P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) at 36-44; C. Fried,
Contract as Promise: A Theory of ContractualObligation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981) at chs. 2 and 8.
[1941] 2 All E.R. 165 (H.L.) [hereinafter Constantine].
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evidence. 85 The House of Lords also held in this case that once the frustrating event is established, an allegation that it was self-induced needs to be
proven by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff fails to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that this event resulted from the defendant's faulty actions,
the defence of frustration will stand undefeated.
This ruling was made in a lawsuit brought by charterers of a ship against
its owners for failure to load. The charterers sought to recover contract
damages for this failure, while the shipowners contended that no damages
were due because their ship had been destroyed by an explosion. The key
issue was whether the shipowners were at fault for the explosion. Evidence
for resolving this issue was unavailable. Consequently, the outcome of the
case depended on the allocation of the risk of error.
The problem that arose in this case was seemingly amenable to an easy
solution under the equality principle. Under this principle, breach of contract needs to be established by the plaintiff. The plaintiff bears the risk of
error in connection with any fact supporting this allegation. Frustration, in
turn, needs to be established by the defendant, who is charged with the risk
of error in relation to any fact belonging to the frustrating event. An allegation that the frustration was self-induced is equivalent to an allegation that
the contract was breached by the defendant, with the latter shifting the risk
of error back to the plaintiff.
This solution does not really solve the problem. First, the defendants'
claim of frustration could easily have been reformulated into a non-breach
of the contract. The defendants could have argued that fulfilment of their
contractual obligation had been dependent upon non-occurrence of frustrating events, such as destruction of their vessel, in which they played no
part. If this had held true, the defendants could not have been accused of
breaching the contract. At the same time, the plaintiffs could have argued,
as they actually did, that the defence of frustration is an extraneous excuse
that exempts the defendant, on exceptional grounds, from his liability for
the breach of contract. Absence of fault is one of the conditions for activating this excuse. If this had held true, the defendants' contention should
have been held groundless. in the absence of evidence preponderantly
showing that the frustrating event had occurred through no fault of theirs.
Because framing of the issue in one way or another is merely a verbal matter,
86
the solution offered by the equality principle suffers from arbitrariness.
Julius Stone suggested that the problem should be resolved by invoking
general frequencies. According to him, this solution of the problem also
85

Ibid. The same holds true also in the United States and in Canada. See McCormick,
supra note 1, at 430; Sopinka et a., supra note 77 at 80, 90-91 (explaining this and similar rules by 'our traditional notion ofjustice').
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wouldjustify the House of Lords' decision. 87 Contracts are more often complied with than breached. Breach of contract must, therefore, be prepon88
derantly established by the plaintiff. Frustration is a rare event ex hypothesi.
As such, it must be established by the defendant as more probable than not.
Frustration occurs more often without fault than through fault on the part
of the defendant. Hence, it is for the plaintiff to preponderantly establish
an allegation that the defendant contributed to the occurrence of the frustrating event. Risk of error will, thus, fall always upon the party seeking to
prove the less likely event, which, arguably, will enhance the accuracy ofju89
dicial verdicts.
An alternative explanation of the Law Lords' decision (with echoes of
Stone's theory) is founded on the observation that compliance with legal
standards is generally more recurrent than wrongdoing. This explanation
advocates a rebuttable presumption of civility. Because people normally
comply with the law, a person who attributes a wrongdoing to his opponent
must preponderantly establish this allegation.9" Breach of contract, therefore, must be established by the plaintiff, and it is for the defendant to prove
that the contract was frustrated. 91 An allegation that the frustrating event
86

87

88

89

SeeJ. Stone, 'Burden of Proof and the judicial Process' (1944) 60 L.Q. Rev. 262. Application of the equality principle is dependent upon the conventional classification of the
issue as belonging to a cause of action, as opposed to a defence. When the legal convention is unclear, as it was before Constantine, the equality principle is of no assistance.
Compare P. Westen, 'The Empty Idea of Equality' (1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537.
Stone, ibid. Other reasons supporting the House of Lords' decision are less persuasive.
This is especially true of the omnia praesumunturpronegante principle, originating from a
widespread, but nonetheless fallacious, belief that proof of 'negative facts' is especially
onerous. First, there is no real distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' facts. A 'negative' proposition that 'the defendants did not do anything to contribute to their ship's
explosion' can easily be transformed into a positive one: 'the defendants' ship was blown
up single-handedly by a stranger.' Compare Stone, ibid. Second, proving 'negative facts'
(assuming such a thing exists) is not difficult at all. Proving that the defendants' ship
exploded through no fault on their part is much easier than relating the explosion to
some specified cause. For the former purpose, a general testimony regarding the
defendants' non-involvement in the incident will suffice. Absence of further evidence
will only help the defendants, whose testimony will stand uncontradicted. For the latter
purpose, however, proof of this kind will obviously be insufficient. Hence, 'positive' facts
would usually be more difficult to prove than 'negative facts.' See A. Sidgwick, Fallacies:A
View of Logic from the PracticalSide (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1890)
at 250-51.
Events making the performance of a contract impossible or unduly onerous will be
regarded as frustrating only if they could not be reasonablycontemplated by the parties at
the time that they entered into the contract. See, e.g., H.J. Berman, 'Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International Trade' (1963) 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 1413 at 1415-16; 1438. Frustrating events can thus be seen as improbable ex ante.
Stone, supra note 86.
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was self-induced clearly attributes a wrongdoing to the defendant. The burden of persuasion with92regard to this allegation should, therefore, be shouldered by the plaintiff.

These frequentist explanations, however, are inadequate. If the frequencies alluded to belong to experience, they must be accounted for by judges
before they allocate the persuasion burden. Blended with the rest of the evidence, these frequencies might tilt the scales to the benefit of the plaintiff
or of the defendant, as the circumstances dictate. When this happens, the
burden of persuasion becomes irrelevant. 93 This burden must be resorted
to only upon arrival at a factual impasse, when the judges hang in indecision. In any such case, factual impasse will be a result of deliberation that
has already weighed the existing frequencies. To use them again as ajustification for imposing the risk of error on the party whose allegations run
against the 94
regular is to count them twice. This double-counting is plainly
anomalous.

The Constantinedoctrine is, therefore, better explained by the expectation principle. This principle refers to the expectations grounded in the
90

91
92

93

94

DA. Nance, 'Civility and the Burden of Proof (1994) 17 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 647 at
655-67. Parts of Lord Wright's speech in Constantine (supra note 84 at 191A-C, 193D-E)
coincide with this approach.
Under this theory, the defence of frustration presumably is translated into an allegation
that the plaintiff wrongfully insists upon performance of the contract.
Dale Nance supports his 'civility presumption' also on normative grounds, which I find
problematic. I can see no normative reason for applying this presumption in a balanced
case, where the probabilities of transgression and of compliance are equal. This presumption cannot be applied also in cases where either the plaintiff or the defendant is
responsible for the litigated damage. In any such case, by upholding the presumption in
relation to the defendant, the judges would violate it with regard to the plaintiff or vice
versa. See Stein, supra note 4 at 337-38.
The decision in Constantine may be understood as ascribing a tie-breaking potential to
general frequencies. On the basis of this understanding, judges should avoid using these
frequencies when evaluating the evidence adduced by the parties, in order to prevent
double-counting. This seems to be both unrealistic and wrong in principle. This understanding of Constantine also sheds no light on cases where the relevant frequencies have
been considered by the judges, who still remain undecided.
See V.C. Ball, 'The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof' (1961)
14 Vand. L. Rev. 807 at 817-18. The same is true in regard to a party's better access to the
evidence as a reason for marking him bearer of the risk of non-persuasion. Attenuated
by the contemporary disclosure principles, this advantage can be removed by imposing
on its holder the burden of adducing evidence. Once this party produces evidence for
examination at the trial, his advantage evaporates and therefore cannot be used against
him any further. As argued by Thayer more than a century ago, allocation of the risk of
error should be guided by strictly substantive preferences. See J.B. Thayer, 'The Burdens
of Proof' (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 45. Further support for Thayer's thesis can be found in
Stein, supra note 41.
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parties' mutual exchange of promises, namely, the expectation of performance, the expectation of liability and the expectation of release. These mutual expectations need not coincide with the empirical frequencies of the
outside world. They should be allowed to determine the parties' rights and
obligations as a matter of contract. These expectations should thus be allowed to resolve factual impasse by placing the risk of non-persuasion, along
with the corresponding risk of error, upon the party arguing against the expected. This allocation of the risk is justified by the general protection of
the expectation interest under contract law. As with any other contract, the
contract in Constantineentailed a mutual expectation of performance. An
allegation that the contract was breached was an allegation against the expected. As such, it had to be preponderantly established by the plaintiffs. If
this allegation were as probable as an allegation that the contract was performed, the defendants should have prevailed. The contract in Constantine
also entailed an expectation of liability. A party that failed to perform the
contract obviously was expected to be held liable. An allegation that he is
not liable (due to frustration of the contract, non-fulfilment of a condition
for performance or for any other reason) would be an allegation against the
expected. If this party fails to establish this allegation by a preponderance
of the evidence, his opponent should prevail. For unexpected events that
frustrate the contract, the contract entailed an expectation of release. A party attempting to upset this expectation by arguing that the frustrating event
was induced by his opponent should, therefore, bear the risk of error, if after considering the evidence, the judges still were undecided. General frequencies pertaining to the case at hand should be considered by thejudges,
along with the specific evidence. These frequencies, however, must have no
tie-breaking power. This power should attach to the parties' contractual expectations alone. These expectations often coincide with the general frequencies, but they need not coincide with those frequencies in order to retain their tie-breaking power in a balanced case. Consequently, allocation
of the risk of error will be regulated by a normative principle of expectation
that implements the parties' bargain and not by empirical contingencies
that vary from case to case.
The reasoning of the Law Lords in Constantinecontains one explicit (albeit not full) endorsement of this principle, 95 and at least one implicit indication in this direction.9 6 The expectation principle emerges more
clearly if the Constantinedoctrine is juxtaposed with another well-known
decision, Coldman v. Hill.9 7 Under the Coldman doctrine, a bailee seeking
to release herself from responsibility for bailed goods, which have been either lost or damaged during the bailment period, must preponderantly
prove that the loss occurred without any fault on her part. 98 This doctrine
apparently contradicts Constantine.When bailed goods have been lost or
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damaged, the bailment contract must have been either breached by the
bailee or frustrated by some unforeseeable external cause over which the
bailee could exercise no control. Under Constantine,the bailee's failure to
safeguard the goods would amount to a breach of contract, an allegation
that would need to be established by the goods-owner as more probable
than not. Frustration of the contract would, in turn, have to be established
by the bailee. An allegation that the contract was frustrated through some
fault on the part of the bailee would be maintaining that the frustration
was self-induced. Functionally equivalent to a breach of contract allegation, this allegation would need to be preponderantly proved by the goodsowner.
Constantineand Coidman are, indeed, treated in the literature as inconsistent doctrines, based upon different policies. 99 The precise nature of
these policies remains unarticulated. In my view, the two doctrines are not
inconsistent: their different outcomes are comfortably explained by the expectation principle, which both doctrines seem to endorse. In bailment
contracts, the parties typically contemplate that goods deposited in the
hands of the bailee are unlikely to be lost or damaged without some fault
on her part. Consequently, the bailee is expected to assume liability when
95

96
97
98

99

See Viscount Maugham's judgment in Constantine, supra note 84 at 175F-G, 178E-H
('whether or not the [frustration] doctrine simply rests on a term or condition to be
implied in the contract itself, or whether it is otherwise to be explained, it is clear that it
is based upon the presumed common intention of the parties. ... The present question
can therefore be tested by asking what term or condition as to onus of proof ought to be
implied here in relation to the destruction of the vessel. ... I agree that ... the term or
condition which might reasonably be implied ... in this case, or in any case of true frustration, does not throw on the plaintiff or claimant the burden of proving something
which it may be impossible in practice to prove. The term or condition is not for the
benefit of one party rather than the other. ... In these circumstances, I cannot see why a
court should decide that the parties ought to be presumed to have intended that the
ordinary rules as to onus of proof ought not to apply.... To my mind, [a condition
requiring the shipowners to prove absence of their fault] ... is a condition which is artificial, and which may operate in some cases with great injustice').
See Constantine, supra note 84 at 171H-172C, Viscount Simon, L.C.
Coldmanv. Hill, [1919] 1 K.B. 443 [hereinafter Coldman].
This doctrine is well-settled at common law. See generally N.E. Palmer, Bailment (Sydney:
The Law Book Company, 1979) at 40. See also Tapper, supra note 1 at 134 (for the English law); NationalTrust Co. Ltd. v. Wong Aviation, Ltd. (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 55 (S.C.C.);
Amo ContainersLtd. v. Mobil Oil Canada,Ltd. (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4th) 104 (Nfld, CA.) (for
the Canadian law);J.H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Lau4 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1940) vol. 9, par. 2508 at 375-76;
McCormick, supra note 1 at 456-57; C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Evidence (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1995) at 148-49 (for the American law, which is less clear).
See Tapper, ibid.; Keane, supra note 77 at 78.
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the goods are lost or damaged due to some unknown cause. The bailee is
expected to be liable even when the goods are taken away (or damaged) by
another person who acted against the bailee's will, unless it is clear that she
was unable to prevent the loss.100 The bailee, in other words, is expected to
be liable not only for losses positively attributable to some fault on her part,
but also for causally indeterminate losses.101 Originating from special care
that needs to be exercised by a bailee in relation to the bailed goods, this
expectation is the very essence of the bailment contract. 102 In view of this
expectation, the bailee should, indeed, be required to prove her faultlessness on a balance of probabilities. Because her faultlessness was contractually contemplated as unlikely, it should come as no surprise that the law
marks her as the bearer of the risk of error in cases involving causally indeterminate losses. No such expectation could be elicited in the context of the
charterer-shipowner relationship dealt with in Constantine.In this case, the
shipowners undertook no special obligation to protect the goods, which
they failed to load, prior to loading. This explains the different decision
rule chosen by the Law Lords in Constantine.
With this understanding of the expectation principle in mind, we can
now move on to analyze our main issue. A policy-holder suing the insurer
will recover upon proof of the loss that is covered by the policy. There is no
expectation of performance by the insurer absent such proof. The proof is
not required to reach the level of certainty. Under the general law, proof on
a balance of probabilities will suffice if it points to the loss insured against
by the policy-holder. Such proof will give rise to the expectation of the insurer's performance. What the proof is required to point to in terms of content also will depend on the relevant expectations. The insured obviously is
expected to provide evidence that will establish the nature and the extent
of his loss. As for the cause of the loss, the expectation principle will accord
a differentiated treatment to this component of the insured's lawsuit. When
the insurance policy extends only to a specified class of losses, such as losses
resulting from 'theft' or from 'fire,' evidence establishing the precise cause
of the loss has to be adduced. There can be no expectation of performance
100 See Palmer, supra note 98. In some cases, however, the bailee was charged only with the
evidential burden (wrongly, in my opinion). See Palmer, ibid.; Wigmore, supra note 98;
McCormick, supra note 1 at 456-57.
101 This resonates with the 'evidential damage' doctrine advocated by Porat & Stein, supra
note 6. A bailee can reasonably be expected to protect not only the goods themselves,
but also any information pertaining to their whereabouts during the bailment period.
She should consequently assume liability for uncertainty when the disputed loss of the
bailed goods is causally indeterminate.
102 See Palmer, supra note 98 (in any such case, the bailee will be expected either to admit
liability or to come up with a convincing explanation for the loss).
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on the part of the insurer with regard to unspecified losses. A Rhesa-type lowweight probability, which does not rest upon case-specific information,
would not, consequently, allow the insured to recover from the insurer.
However, when the policy covers 'all risks,' the insured should be granted
recovery upon proof that his loss resulted from some fortuitous event. An allrisk policy entails an expectation of performance by the insurer with regard
to both specified and unspecified losses. This expectation is entailed in insurance coverage that extends to infinite types of accidental losses. Consequently, the insured should not be required to prove the precise nature of
the cause of his loss by case-specific evidence. Because any accidental loss
will provide the basis for the insured's case, its cause need not be identified.
A low-weight probability favouring the insured's case thus becomes decisive.
This analysis sits well with doctrinal solutions adopted at common law
in England, Canada and the United States. 103 Its implications with regard
to policies covering 'perils of the seas' are transparent. A peril-of-the-seas
policy is an all-risk policy that covers losses precipitated by heavy weather,
collision, stranding, and an infinite number of other misfortunes associated with seas and sailing.10 4 Any such policy entails an expectation of performance by the insurer with regard to both specified and unspecified
losses, as long as the loss is fortuitous and associated with seas. As remarked in a case-note on Rhesa, the insurance in question 'was not against
swordfish or submarines (yellow or red) but against peril of the sea in
103 In British & ForeignMarine InsuranceCompany, Ltd. v. Gaunt, [1921] 2 A.C. 41 (H.L.), the
position of the law was stated by Lord Birkenhead, L.C., as follows:
'We are, of course, to give effect to the rule that the plaintiff must establish his case, that
he must show that the loss comes within terms of his policies; but where all risks are covered by the policy and not merely risks of a specified class or classes, the plaintiff discharges his special onus when he has proved that the loss was caused by some event covered by the general expression, and he is not bound to go further and prove the exact
nature of the accident or casualty which, in fact, occasioned his loss.' [Emphasis is
mine.]
Ibid. at 47. Lord Birkenhead's expression 'special onus' seems to have been related
to the contractual expectations embedded in an all-risk policy. See also Texas Eastern
Transmission v. Marine Office - Appleton & Cox Corporation,579 F.2d 561 at 564 (10th Cir.
1978); Morrison Grain Company, Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company 632 F.2d 424 at
431 (5th Cir. 1980) (both holding the same). For the Canadian law, which holds the
same, see C. Brown &J. Menezes, Insurance Law in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto, ON: Carswell, 1991) at 5 ('the insured need only establish in general that the loss was within the
range of risks covered without having to prove the exact cause of the damage or injury.')
104 See Brice, supra note 46 at 114. In the Marine InsuranceAct, 1906, the term 'peril of the
seas' refers to all 'fortuitous accidents or casualties of the seas,' excluding 'the ordinary
action of the wind and waves.' Directly applying to marine insurance policies in England, this broad definition is followed in Canada and Australia and is also regarded as
guiding by American courts. See Brice, ibid. at 106-107.
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general.' 10 5 Consequently, the insured should be granted recovery when
it is more probable than not that his loss was occasioned by some unknown, and, therefore, unspecified peril of the seas. A low-weight probability surpassing the 0.5 threshold ought to be treated as sufficient in that
context. 106
VII StipulationforcingPenalty Default
Allocation of the risk of error according to the expectation principle is not
devoid of interpretive difficulties. In contract interpretation, which deals
with unstated intentions and expectations, the line separating the real from
the conjectural is often very fine.10 7 These difficulties could be avoided and
adjudication could be made less expensive, if the possibility of uncertainty
in a future trial was adverted to and explicitly regulated by contracting parties. Because adjudication is subsidized by public funds, parties to a contract
should be encouraged not to leave these difficulties contractually unresolved. They should be encouraged to regulate the uncertainty problem,
whenever it can be reasonably anticipated, by explicitly allocating the risk
of error in their contract. By leaving this problem to be dealt with by the
court, the parties can save in contract negotiation and drafting expenses,
but the price will be an increase in both the likelihood and the cost of their
future litigation. Contracting parties will be unwilling to make this saving
when it introduces an undesirable element of uncertainty into their relationship. But in some cases at least, either one of the parties or both will find
the uncertainty contractually convenient. By leaving the uncertainty problem unregulated, the contracting parties may very well strike a good bargain, but this will entail greater adjudicative subsidy and, therefore, a free
10 8
ride at the taxpayers' expense.
105 M. Clarke, 'Accident Insurance - Peril of the Seas: Yellow Submarine or Red Herring?'
(1985) 44 Camb. L.J. 359 at 360. Robertson & Vignaux (supra note 10 at 472) make a
similar point on the theory that 'the task of the court is to determine the odds that the
defendant is liable.' As submitted by the present essay, this is only one dimension of the
court's task.
106 At common law, as applied in Australia, Canada, England, and the United States, this
outcome will be possible only upon supplementary proof of seaworthiness prior to the
sailing. See Brice, supra note 46 at 113-29. This pre-emptive requirement impliedly (and
sometimes explicitly) attributes an unexplained loss to the vessel's unseaworthiness.
Brice, ibid. at 114. Alas, the possibility of unseaworthiness must have already been considered by the fact-finders prior to arriving at the probability that happens to support the
insured. The possibility of unseaworthiness will thus be counted twice against the
insured, which is clearly anomalous.
107 See Zamir, supra note 82; Charny, ibid.
108 Compare Charny, ibid. at 1841.
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This harmful externality can be minimized by laying down an appropriate default rule that will penalize the party responsible for the failure to
contractually regulate in advance the uncertainty problem. 109 Insofar as it
forcesjudges to adjudicate incomplete bargains, this lacuna is a kind of evidential damage, and a party that inflicts this damage should normally bear
responsibility for its consequences. 11 0 In the present context, this responsibility should assume the form of risk-allocation: the risk of error should
be shifted to the party responsible for leaving the uncertainty problem unregulated.1 11 This approach will be suitable only for cases where the uncertainty problem could have been reasonably anticipated by at least one of
the parties prior to concluding the contract. When the problem could not
have been reasonably anticipated, the proposed default rule will be nonapplicable. In fact, this rule might not be appropriate even when the uncertainty problem could have been anticipated. This would happen in cases where there is sufficient knowledge about the parties' 'would-be agreement' - namely, the agreement that would have been reached by the
parties had they addressed the uncertainty problem in their negotiations.
In any such case, the penalty-default rule would force the parties into making an explicit stipulation that regulates the uncertainty problem in advance by identifying the bearer of the risk of error. This would involve separate negotiations and contract drafting - that is, greater transaction costs.
These costs could be saved by laying down another default rule, one that
mirrors the parties' would-be agreement.
In the insurance context, the possibility of litigation is always anticipated by the contracting parties. In property insurance, the prospect of causally uncertain losses lies within the boundaries of the parties' reasonable,
if not actual, contemplation. The problem of causally uncertain losses and
the low-weight probability problem are two sides of the very same coin.
When a loss is causally uncertain, there is always a naked probability that
it falls under the insurance coverage, and when this probability is greater
than 0.5, the insured's claim is, arguably, more probable than not.1 12 This
position is problematic because the probability in support of the insured's
109 This idea belongs to I. Ayres & R. Gertner, 'Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules' (1989) 99 Yale L.J. 87; I. Ayres & R. Gertner, 'Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules' (1992) 101 Yale L.J.
729. For its thoughtful discussion, showing that the Ayres-Gertner model may be disturbed by strategic bargaining, see J.S. Johnston, 'Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules' (1990) 100 Yale L.J. 615.

110 See generally, Porat & Stein, supra note 6.
111 Compare Porat & Stein, ibid. (applying the same approach in tort litigation).
112 When this probability falls below the 0.5 threshold, it is contractually expected that the
insured will not recover from the underwriter.
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claim is a low-weight probability. My preceding discussion demonstrated
that this problem is amenable to a general legal solution that mirrors the
parties' typical expectations and that maintains equality in the allocation
of the risk of error. From this solution, an expectation-mirroring default
rule can be derived for insurance policies covering 'perils of the seas' and
(afortiori) 'all-risks.' Because this solution may not be accepted across-theboard, the low-weight probability problem also should be examined as a
problem with no general solution in the law. This problem, therefore,
should be perceived also as a contractual ambiguity. Accordingly, contracting parties should be impelled to resolve this problem for themselves, and
the proposed penalty-default rule would provide the required incentive.
Operating similarly to the contra proferentem doctrine, 113 the proposed
penalty-default rule can be accommodated within this doctrine if we place
the risk of error upon the drafter of the contract. 114 In the case at hand,
the risk of error associated with the low-weight probability seemingly
should be placed on the underwriters, who drafted the 'perils of the seas'
policy purchased by the insured. This is only seemingly so because the policy in question is a commercial policy, not a household or other 'small-consumer' policy that should be treated as a 'contract of adhesion.' 115 The
113 This doctrine holds that textual ambiguities in a contract should be resolved against the
party who drafted the contract. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 78 at 352-57. For the Canadian law, see Manulife Bank of Canada v. Conlin (1996), 139 D.L.R. (4th) 426 (S.C.C.)
(applying and examining the rationale of the contra proferentem doctrine); Yang v. Canadian Lavoyers'InsuranceAssn. (1997), 147 D.L.R. (4th) 31 (Alta. CA.) (reconfirming the
applicability of the doctrine to insurance contracts).
In The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d (St. Paul
MN: American Law Institute Publishers, 1981) §206, vol. 2 at 105, this doctrine is formulated as follows:
'In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term
thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.'
See also Zamir, supra note 82, at 1724-25 (examining the contraproferentem doctrine
and its penalty-default justification).
114 This, of course, will constitute an expansion of the traditional doctrine, which applies to
textual ambiguities, as opposed to lacunae. Because there are no substantial differences
between the two kinds of contractual ambiguity, the proposed rule can be easily accommodated in the existing law.
115 See F. Kessler, 'Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract'
(1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629; T.D. Rakoff, 'Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction' (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173. In such contracts, transaction terms are dictated
by the drafting party, which might justify legal interference on the grounds of both efficiency and fairness. For an efficiency-based justification, see A.W. Katz, 'Standard Form
Contracts' in P. Newman, ed., The New PaigraveDictionary of Economics and the Law (MacMillan Press, forthcoming in 1998).
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bargaining powers of the underwriters and the shipowners in Rhesa were
not grossly unequal (if at all), so that the shipowners were no less responsible than the underwriters for the text of the insurance policy. Both parties, therefore, should have been held equally responsible for the ambiguity. Even if we take the insurance policy as a standard form dictated by
customary practices and, therefore, non-negotiable, the responsibility for
not providing a contractual solution for causally uncertain losses should
also have been shared equally by both parties. Hence, neither of the parties should have suffered from the low-weight probability problem to the
opposing party's benefit. The low-weight probability should have been taken for its statistical value, and because this probability favoured the insured, the insured ought to have been allowed to recover from the underwriters.
The same conclusion would be reached, of course, if the underwriters,
as the ultimate drafters of the insurance policy, were held responsible for
the contractual ambiguity. In both cases, underwriters would be forced to
include in their insurance policies an explicit regulation of causally uncertain losses. Consequently, some policies would not cover such losses by explicitly requiring specific proof of the peril insured against. This would
make those policies less expensive. Other policies would cover causally uncertain losses, which would make them more expensive to purchase. Finally,
all policies would be sufficiently clear with respect to causally uncertain losses, so that their purchasers would know exactly what they are purchasing.
There would be no marketing incentive for underwriters to avoid the issue
in drafting the insurance policies. This approach would ensure justice and
fairness for both the policy-holder and her underwriter, as well as make the
insurance market more efficient. As opined by Judge Posner with regard to
insurance contracts in general,
the principle that insurance contracts are to be construed against the insurer ...
may seem paternalistic and sentimental, but there is an economic argument for it.
One's insurance coverage will turn out to be less extensive than it appeared to be,
if ambiguities in the insurance policy are resolved against the insured. The insurance company is the superior bearer of this risk too. Of course, if all interpretive
doubts are resolved against the insurance company, its costs, and hence premium
rates, will be
higher. But all this means is that the insured is buying some additional
116
insurance.
VIII The Error-minimizingPrinciple

The problem faced by the courts in Rhesa also can be resolved in a way that
promotes economic efficiency. This could be achieved by allocating the risk
of error in a way that would minimize the total amount of both direct and
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indirect economic losses. Utilitarian in character, this approach would favour the rule that generates, in the long run, the greatest possible amount
of correct decisions.
One of the principal objectives of insurance law is to spread the costs of
accidents amongst the insured individuals. 117 Every insurance contract proceeds on the assumption that for the risk-averse individual, a 1 per cent
probability of, say, a fire causing $100,000 in damage constitutes a risk that
is more costly than its actuarial equivalent, $1,000. The individual, therefore, is willing to shift the risk to an underwriter in exchange for an insurance premium. An assumption of this risk by an underwriter will cost no
more than $1,000 because in the long run, in the context of cases similar to
this, the underwriter pays the insured no more than $1,000 per case: the risk
insured against will materialize only in 1 out of every 100 cases. The collective payment collected from the insured individuals by the underwriter represents, therefore, the actuarial equivalent of all the insured losses along
118
with the underwriter's expenses and profit.
This contractual background seems to support the view that factually uncertain cases should be controlled by a probabilistic recovery rule: every insured should receive a payment that is equal to her loss multiplied by the
probability that the loss resulted from the event covered by the insurance
policy. This rule has been advocated as appropriate for recurrent liability
cases, 119 and insurance litigation belongs to this genus of cases. This rule
has been advocated as appropriate also for all cases that involve the risk of
an especially large error, 120 and insurance cases seem to belong to this category as well. It has been argued in this connection that since the utility of
gains steadily diminishes and the disutility of losses continually increases,
the average person's loss of a large sum D (representing the litigated
amount in an uncertain case) would produce a disutility much greater than
D. This disutility can be conveniently taken as amounting to D 2 . By taking
116 RA. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 3d ed. (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co.,
1986) at 95. For the opposite view (which I do not find persuasive), see M.B. Rappaport,
'The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter' (1995) 30 Georgia L. Rev. 171. For a recent case-law analysis
exhibiting different approaches to the contra proferentem doctrine, see K.S. Abraham, 'A
Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation' (1996) 95 Mich. L. Rev. 531.
117 See, e.g., K.S. Abraham, DistributingRisk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986) at 1-2.
118 This common knowledge is supported by an uncontroversial economic analysis: see Posner, supra note 116 at 91-92.
119 See S. Levmore, 'Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs' (1990) 19
J. Legal Stud. 691.
120 See N. Orloff & J. Stedinger, 'A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-theEvidence Standard' (1983) 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1159.
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P, and P2 as denoting, respectively, the probabilities of the plaintiffs and
the defendant's conflicting allegations 121 and by allowing S1 and S2 to represent, respectively, the actual (though unknown) states of affairs, favourable to either the plaintiff or the defendant, an economic comparison may
be made between the following decisions:
dj= The plaintiff loses. (The risk of error is imposed on the plaintiff in its
entirety.)
d2 = The defendant loses. (The risk of error is imposed on the defendant in
its entirety.)
d3 = the probabilistic recovery rule under which the plaintiff recovers from
the defendant pID 2, while p 2D 2 goes to the defendant by not allowing

the plaintiff to recover this amount.
Losses incurred by each of these decisions (per average case) will consequently be as shown in the chart below.
Decision

Loss if S1
2

Loss if S2

Total Loss

0

plD 2

d,

pjD

d2

0

p 2D2

p 2D 2

d3

PI (P2D )2

P2(pjD) 2

PIP 2 D 2

Because Pi and P2 both fall below 1 and are greater than zero, the probabilistic recovery rule (d3 ) will bring to a minimum the total amount of una122
voidable losses.
Despite this favourable effect, the probabilistic recovery rule is not suitable for adoption. On the general level, its adoption would weaken the protection of substantive rights and, thus, undermine the behavioural incentives set by the substantive law. Because under this rule, the number of
correctly decided cases would always be zero, there would be no contracts
that are fully enforceable. Compensation for breach of contract and for tortiously inflicted damages also would never be full. Security and predictability, sought to be maintained by the law in a wide variety of human affairs,
would, thus, be frustrated. This chilling prospect would thwart a good deal
of socially beneficial activities. Many transactions that could otherwise transpire and produce economically efficient exchanges would not be effected.
Transactions that would still be carried out would have to be accompanied
by more complex and more expensive securitization devices. This social
121 As always is the case: O<pl<l; O<p2<l, when 1 stands for certainty and 0 for impossibility.
122 Orloff& Stedinger, supra note 120.
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disutility would be further increased by the costs of litigation. Intensified
rule, civil litigation would beand complicated by the probabilistic recovery
3
come considerably more expensive.12
In the area of insurance, the probabilistic recovery rule would confer no
significant benefits upon underwriters, who act merely as intermediaries in
the spreading of costs of accidents. This rule would simply reallocate large
sums of money from deserving to non-deserving policy-holders. Because the
list of non-deserving beneficiaries of the rule would include not only bona
fide claimants, but also moral hazards and downright fraudulent free-riders, 124 the result would be a particularly damaging contamination of insurance practices. The emerging free-ride incentives would subvert the security
of insurance, thereby substantially increasing its cost for those who seek enhanced protection. This damage both can and should be avoided by discarding the probabilistic recovery rule in favour of a rule that minimizes the
verdicts. The required rule is discernible from
total number of erroneous
25
the following graph:1
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26
ability greater than 0.5 should prevail (the 'P>0.5 rule').1
123 See Stein, supra note 4 at 335-36.
124 The notion of 'moral hazard' is liable to abuse by insurers, as convincingly demonstrated
by Tom Baker, 'On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard' (1996) 75 Texas L. Rev. 237. The
point made in the text thus refers to genuine moral hazards only - that is, to those who
have an incentive to increase the consumption of insurance benefits in comparison with
the average (by raising the frequency of the accidents or magnitude of the losses covered
by insurance).
125 Adapted from Kaye, supra note 33 at 493.
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The P>0.5 rule should have equal applicability in low-weight probability
cases. Reliance on a low-weight probability is problematic because the validity of any such probability is conditioned upon its evidential base, when this
base is inordinately deficient. Any substantial change in this base, therefore,
will require modification of the probability, which classifies the probability
as non-resilient. This, however, presents a problem for individual cases only,
whereas we are concerned with increasing the overall amount of correct decisions. When decision makers are concerned with long-run accuracy, they
will do well to base their decisions on low-weight probabilities. By its very nature, missing information gives no clue as to the identity of its potential beneficiary. Because it may potentially benefit both the plaintiff and the defendant, this information is susceptible to randomization. It can be
postulated that by working in both directions, this information could benefit roughly the same number of plaintiffs and of defendants. Because the
missing information varies in each case, rather than being constant in all
cases, this randomization is supported by statistical theory. A straightforward analogy can be made between this randomization and flipping an unbiased coin, an experiment justifiably expected to result in a roughly equal
number of heads and tails. This randomization is reliant on the problematic
principle of indifference, but this principle is almost as good for the longrun as it is bad for individual cases.127 In conditions of uncertainty, indifference towards individual possibilities of error is, indeed, instrumental to
maximizing the amount of correct decisions in the long run.
This utilitarian approach, therefore, supports the plaintiffs in Rhesa.
Hence, the Law Lords' decision in favour of the defendants appears to be
wrong under every conceivable principle and policy.
IX Summing Up
This essay has demonstrated the incompleteness of the burden of proof
doctrine as a mechanism for adjudicating civil cases in conditions of uncertainty. This doctrine is one-dimensional, whereas rational fact-finding must
be a two-dimensional process. The burden of proof doctrine specifies the
level of probability necessary for making a finding, but does not address the
problem of contingency that accompanies any decision about probability.
Any such decision is epistemically contingent and, therefore, conditionalized upon its underlying evidential base. The broadness of this base - that
126 For more details and references see Stein, supra note 41 at 340-43. For an economic
explanation of the requirement that balanced (P=0.5) cases should be decided for
defendants, see Stein, ibid. at 343.

127 See Cohen, supra note 12 at 46.
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is, the extent to which it incorporates the relevant facts - determines the
weight (or resiliency) of the probability decision. Different probabilities,
therefore, carry different weights that signify the probabilities' strength or
weakness. The strength and weakness (the weight factor) depend on the
breadth of the shortfall between the existing amount of evidence and the
ideal amount of evidence. Hence, a low-weight probability satisfying the civil standard of proof may not be sufficient for delivering a verdict.
Under this model, some probabilities may be regarded as weighty
enough for the practical purposes of adjudication, whereas others may not
be so regarded. This problem is not amenable to an epistemic solution because it arises at a point where the available sources of information have
been exhausted. The only sustainable solution to this problem lies in the allocation of the risk of error to either the plaintiff or to the defendant. Preferences formed with regard to risk-allocation should relate to the possible
materialization of the risk. Allocation of the risk of error in civil litigation is,
therefore, bound to be different from its allocation in criminal matters.
Moreover, allocation of the risk of error in contract cases should be different from its allocation in tort cases. The distinction between the two types
of cases derives from the fundamental difference between voluntary and involuntary legal relations. In voluntary relations, generalized as 'contracts,'
factual indeterminacy of future litigation can be reduced, or at least regulated, through advance stipulation, a possibility not available in the context
of legal relations such as torts, which are formed involuntarily. Therefore,
allocation of the risk of error in contract cases should generally correspond
to the parties' contractual expectations. These expectations also should determine the allocation of the burden of proof in general. Identified as the
expectation principle, this approach is not merely normative; it also accounts for the existing doctrinal ramifications, which otherwise would appear incoherent. Allocation of the risk of error in cases involving low-weight
probabilities may, therefore,justifiably be based upon this approach.
Ascertainment of the parties' contractual expectations often proves to
be a rather complex task. This interpretive enterprise frequently ends up
with 'implied terms' being written into the contract, which poses serious
problems. These problems do not surface when the required stipulation is
included explicitly in the contract. Therefore, creating incentives that will
force out the required stipulation is yet another possibility for allocating the
risk of error. As with the expectation approach, this possibility is available
in contract cases only. Default provisions that fill in the contractual gaps
both can and should be directed to this end. These provisions should be
drafted in a way that will penalize one of the parties for failing to explicitly
allocate the risk of error in the contract, in one way or another. The party
to be thus penalized is the party who can identify the uncertainty problem
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more easily than her opponent, a criterion that would tend to penalize the
drafter of the contract. Because litigation is subsidized by tax money, contractual gaps that entail the possibility of an unregulated factual impasse
should be treated as a kind of externality that needs to be counteracted by
the law. Resonating with the contraprofierentem doctrine, this stipulation-forcing approach would be effective only in relation to contracts that can reasonably anticipate litigation and the accompanying problem of uncertainty.
There is a broad spectrum of contracts that belong to this category, and insurance contracts certainly are included in this spectrum.
Allocation of the risk of error also can follow the equality principle. This
principle produces decision rules for factually uncertain cases by treating
the risk of sustaining a wrongful loss as equally detrimental to the plaintiff
as it is to the defendant. Alternatively, risk-allocation may be used as an instrument for furthering a variety of social policies, utilitarian in nature.
These two possibilities are equally available in contract litigation and in tort
litigation. They can resolve any factual impasse, including the low-weight
probability problem. Along with the expectation principle and the stipulation-forcing penalty default, these possibilities form a cluster of plausible solutions to the low-weight probability problem. The potential operation of all
these principles and policies has been demonstrated in the analysis of Rhesa,
a landmark decision of the House of Lords that addressed the low-weight
probability problem. As demonstrated by my analysis, each of these principles and policies runs counter to the outcome reached by the Law Lords.
The above principles and policies are not exclusive, and I am not offering a meta-principle that can establish their normative superiority over other potential candidates. These principles and policies have been chosen on
endogenous grounds: the normative attitudes they display are broadly instantiated in the positive law. The doctrinal possibility of adopting them is
more real, therefore, than in the case of other principles and policies. Indeed, my analysis of the uncertainty problem in contract litigation is meant
to be both normative and positive.
The proposed principles and policies might not coexist in harmony.
The expectation principle may be at odds with a penalty default provision
uncontemplated by the contracting parties. Implementation of certain social policies may clash with the requirement that individuals be treated as
equals. Furthermore, a perennial tension exists between equality and utility, and one can easily envision other combinations of potential clashes between the proposed principles and policies. Fragmentation is the only remedy to this problem. Different principles and policies should apply in
different settings. Principles and policies suitable for particular settings,
such as insurance contracts, may not be suitable in other settings, such as
collective employment contracts. Allocation of the risk of error must be tied
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to the relevant substantive objectives of the law. These objectives should accord preference to one of the risk-allocating principles or policies. It is,
therefore, these substantive objectives - not a Procrustean application of
the burden of proof doctrine - that should ultimately identify the bearer of
the risk of error.

